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Abstract
In this thesis, we define various security notions for HMA and HAE and study relations
among them. For privacy, we define a homomorphic version of IND-CCA. While for homo-
morphic encryption, the usual IND-CCA security is not achievable due to the malleability,
nevertheless we may define a version of IND-CCA for HAE. It is because that for HAE,
encryption of a plaintext is done with respect to a ‘label’, and similarly decryption of a ci-
phertext is done with respect to a ‘labeled program’. So, while the ciphertext is still malleable
by function evaluation, a decryption query should essentially declare how the ciphertext was
produced. This allows a homomorphic version of IND-CCA to be defined naturally.
For authenticity, we define UF-CMA for HMA, the homomorphic version of the unforge-
ability when the adversary has access to the authentication oracle. We also consider UF-CTA,
where the adversary not only has the authentication oracle but also the verification oracle.
Moreover, we consider strong unforgeability flavors of authenticity and define homomorphic
versions accordingly: SUF-CMA and SUF-CTA. These security notions of HMA can be nat-
urally translated to those of HAE such as UF-CPA, UF-CCA, SUF-CPA and SUF-CCA.
We investigate relationship between these notions, and, for example, show that SUF-CMA
implies SUF-CTA and similarly SUF-CPA implies SUF-CCA. And, we show that IND-CPA
and SUF-CPA imply IND-CCA. Together, this shows that a HAE scheme with IND-CPA
and SUF-CPA security is in fact IND-CCA and SUF-CCA.
Also, we propose an HAE scheme and an HMA scheme supporting arithmetic circuits.
These schemes are not fully homomorphic, but only somewhat homomorphic, but we show
that our schemes are fully secure. In case of our HMA scheme, it satisfies SUF-CTA and only
needs a weak assumption that a PRF exists. In case of our HAE scheme, it satisfies both IND-
CCA and SUF-CCA. And it is a simple and natural construction based on the error-free
approximate GCD (EF-AGCD) assumption. EF-AGCD assumption was used before [25,
11, 12, 9, 10] in constructing fully homomorphic encryption schemes supporting boolean
circuits, but here we use it to construct a HAE scheme supporting arithmetic circuits on
ZQ for Q ∈ Z+. In case of our HMA scheme, it satisfies SUF-CTA, that is, it is strongly
unforgeable even though an adversary is given not only the authentication oracle but also
the verification oracle.
Finally, we analyze the security of the homomorphic authenticated encryption schemes
obtained by generic compositions of an homomorphic secret-key encryption (HSE) scheme
and a homomorphic message authentication (HMA) scheme. There are three possible ways of
generic compositions; Encrypt and Authenticate (E&A), Authenticate then Encrypt (AtE),
Encrypt then Authenticate (EtA). The E&A composition preserves only unforgeability of
HMA. The AtE composition preserves both privacy of HSE and unforgeability of HMA, but
not strong unforgeability of HMA. The EtA composition preserves all security properties of
HSE and HMA. In particular, if HSE is IND-CPA and HMA is UF-CTA, then their EtA
composition achieves IND-CCA.
i
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Homomorphic cryptography allows processing of cryptographically protected data. For example,
homomorphic encryption lets a third party which does not have the secret key to evaluate
functions implicitly using only ciphertexts so that the computed ciphertext decrypts to the
correct function value. Similarly, homomorphic signature allows a third party who is not the
signer to derive a signature to the output of a function, given signatures of the inputs. This
possibility for secure delegation of computation could potentially be used for many applications
including cloud computing, and so it makes homomorphic cryptography a very interesting area,
which was recently attracting many focused research activities, especially since Gentry’s first
construction [15] of a fully homomorphic encryption scheme in 2009.
While existing fully homomorphic encryption schemes are still many orders slower than
ordinary encryption schemes to be truly practical, many progresses are already being made in
improving the efficiency of fully homomorphic encryption schemes [25, 24, 6, 7, 16, 11, 12, 3, 5,
17, 18, 9, 4, 10]. Eventually, a truly practical fully homomorphic encryption scheme could be
used to implement secure cloud computing services where even the cloud provider cannot break
the privacy of the data stored and processed by the cloud.
But, if such user data is important enough to protect its privacy, in many scenarios the
authenticity of the data would also be worth protecting simultaneously. Indeed, in secret-key
cryptography, the authenticated encryption [23, 2, 13, 22] is exactly such a primitive protect-
ing both privacy and authenticity of data. Therefore, we would like to study homomorphic
authenticated encryption (henceforth abbreviated as HAE), which is a natural analogue of the
authenticated encryption for homomorphic cryptography. An HAE is a primitive of secret-key
cryptography which allows public evaluation of functions using only corresponding ciphertexts.
Just as in the case of homomorphic encryption, one important goal in this area might be
to design a fully homomorphic authenticated encryption. Since there are several known con-
structions of fully homomorphic encryption schemes and fully homomorphic signature [19], we
can think that there exist a fully homomorphic secret-key encryption scheme and a fully ho-
momorphic message authentication scheme. And so we may construct a fully homomorphic
authenticated encryption scheme by generic composition [2].
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Related work
Gennaro and Wichs [14] proposed the first construction of the fully homomorphic message
authentication. Their construction uses FHE, and exploits the randomness in the encryption
to hide information necessary for authentication. In fact, since their scheme naturally encrypts
plaintexts using FHE, it is already a fully homomorphic authenticated encryption. But, their
construction essentially does not allow verification queries, so it satisfies only weaker security
notions: IND-CPA and UF-CPA, according to our definition.
Catalano and Fiore [8] proposed two somewhat homomorphic message authentication schemes
supporting arithmetic circuits on Zp for prime modulus p. In their construction, a tag for a mes-
sage m is a polynomial σ(X) such that its constant term σ(0) is equal to the message m, and its
value σ(α) on a hidden random point α is equal to randomness determined by the ‘label’ τ of the
message m. While their construction is very simple and practical for low-degree polynomials, it
does not protect privacy of data, and it seems that this cannot be changed by simple modifica-
tions, for example by choosing a secret random value β as the value satisfying σ(β) = m. Also,
in their scheme, the size of the prime modulus p is determined by the security parameter, so it
cannot be chosen arbitrarily by the application.
Our homomorphic authenticated encryption scheme is not as efficient as the schemes of Cata-
lano and Fiore, but certainly more efficient than the generically composed HAE of a FHE scheme
and the Catalano-Fiore homomorphic message authentication. And our scheme is also very sim-
ple and its security is based on the EF-AGCD assumption, an assumption which was used in
the context of fully homomorphic encryption schemes before. Moreover, in our construction, the
modulus Q does not depend on the security parameter so that it can be chosen depending on
the application. And our scheme can also be compared with a homomorphic encryption scheme
called IDGHV presented in [9]. It supports encryption of a plaintext vector (m1, . . . ,m`) where
each mi is an element in ZQi . Like our scheme, IDGHV also uses the Chinese remainder the-
orem, and indeed our construction can be seen as a special-case, secret-key variant of IDGHV
where ` = 1, and where encryption randomness is pseudorandomly generated from the label.
The privacy of our homomorphic authenticated encryption scheme is proved using the de-
cisional EF-AGCD assumption, which is suggested by Cheon at al. [9]. Recently, Coron et al.
proposed a scale-invariant fully homomorphic encryption scheme over integers [10] in PKC 2014.
In the thesis, they showed that the decisional EF-AGCD assumption is equivalent to the (com-
putational) EF-AGCD GCD assumption. Therefore, the privacy of our scheme is in fact based
on the computational EF-AGCD assumption. Note that in a previous version of this thesis, the
privacy of our scheme was based more directly on the EF-AGCD assumption, but the proof was
done only for smooth modulus Q.
Security notions of the authenticated encryption was studied before. Bellare and Namprem-
pre [2] studied both privacy and authenticity of authenticated encryption schemes, and the au-
thenticity notions are later studied further by Bellare, Goldreich and Mityagin [1]. Our UF-CPA
and SUF-CPA can be considered as homomorphic versions of INT-PTXT-1 and INT-CTXT-1
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of [1], respectively. Our UF-CCA and SUF-CCA are comparable to homomorphic versions of
INT-PTXT-M and INT-CTXT-M, respectively, but in our (S)UF-CCA, the adversary has access
to the decryption oracle, while in INT-PTXT-M and INT-CTXT-M, the adversary has access
to the verification oracle.
Contribution
Our contribution in this thesis can be summarized as follows. First, we define various security
notions for HMA and HAE and study relations among them. For privacy, we define a homo-
morphic version of IND-CCA. While for homomorphic encryption, the usual IND-CCA security
is not achievable due to the malleability, nevertheless we may define a version of IND-CCA for
HAE. It is because that for HAE, encryption of a plaintext is done with respect to a ‘label’,
and similarly decryption of a ciphertext is done with respect to a ‘labeled program’. So, while
the ciphertext is still malleable by function evaluation, a decryption query should essentially
declare how the ciphertext was produced. This allows a homomorphic version of IND-CCA to
be defined naturally.
For authenticity, we define UF-CMA for HMA, the homomorphic version of the unforge-
ability when the adversary has access to the authentication oracle. We also consider UF-CTA,
where the adversary not only has the authentication oracle but also the verification oracle. More-
over, we consider strong unforgeability flavors of authenticity and define homomorphic versions
accordingly: SUF-CMA and SUF-CTA. These security notions of HMA can be naturally trans-
lated to those of HAE such as UF-CPA, UF-CCA, SUF-CPA and SUF-CCA. We investigate
relationship between these notions, and, for example, show that SUF-CMA implies SUF-CTA
and similarly SUF-CPA implies SUF-CCA. And, we show that IND-CPA and SUF-CPA imply
IND-CCA. Together, this shows that a HAE scheme with IND-CPA and SUF-CPA security is
in fact IND-CCA and SUF-CCA.
The second contribution is that we propose an HAE scheme and an HMA scheme supporting
arithmetic circuits. These schemes are not fully homomorphic, but only somewhat homomorphic,
but we show that our schemes are fully secure. In case of our HMA scheme, it satisfies SUF-
CTA and only needs a weak assumption that a PRF exists. In case of our HAE scheme, it
satisfies both IND-CCA and SUF-CCA. And it is a simple and natural construction based on
the error-free approximate GCD (EF-AGCD) assumption. EF-AGCD assumption was used
before [25, 11, 12, 9, 10] in constructing fully homomorphic encryption schemes supporting
boolean circuits, but here we use it to construct a HAE scheme supporting arithmetic circuits
on ZQ for Q ∈ Z+. In case of our HMA scheme, it satisfies SUF-CTA, that is, it is strongly
unforgeable even though an adversary is given not only the authentication oracle but also the
verification oracle.
The third contribution is that we analyze the security of the homomorphic authenticated
encryption schemes obtained by generic compositions of an homomorphic secret-key encryption
(HSE) scheme and a homomorphic message authentication (HMA) scheme. There are three
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possible ways of generic compositions; Encrypt and Authenticate (E&A), Authenticate then
Encrypt (AtE), Encrypt then Authenticate (EtA). The E&A composition preserves only un-
forgeability of HMA. The AtE composition preserves both privacy of HSE and unforgeability
of HMA, but not strong unforgeability of HMA. The EtA composition preserves all security
properties of HSE and HMA. In particular, if HSE is IND-CPA and HMA is UF-CTA, then
their EtA composition achieves IND-CCA.
Outline
The rest of the thesis is constructed as follows. As a preliminary, some notations, assump-
tions and definitions are given in Chapter 2. Three homomorphic primitives, a homomorphic
secret-key encryption, a homomorphic message authentication and a homomorphic authenticated
encryption are considered in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, respectively. Each chapter
defines the syntax and security notions of the primitive and gives a concrete scheme with se-
curity proofs. In Chapter 6, three possible ways of the generic composition of a homomorphic
secret-key encryption and a homomorphic message authentication to obtain a homomorphic
authenticated encryption are described and analyzed on security.
4
Chapter 2
Preliminary
In this chapter, we give some notations and a definition of a pseudo-random function(PRF).
And we define the error-free approximate greatest common divisor(EF-AGCD) assumptions,
which are used as our security assumptions. Also, we give some lemmas and a description on
arithmetic circuits, used as a model of computation.
2.1 Notations
In this thesis, we use the following notations for intervals of integers. For any real number a
and b, we define
[a, b] := {x ∈ Z | a ≤ x ≤ b} ,
(a, b] := {x ∈ Z | a < x ≤ b} ,
[a, b) := {x ∈ Z | a ≤ x < b} ,
(a, b) := {x ∈ Z | a < x < b} .
For any real number a, the nearest integer bae of a is defined as the unique integer in[
a− 12 , a+ 12
)
. The ring Zn of integers modulo n is represented as the set (−n2 , n2 ]. This means
that
x mod n := x−
⌊x
n
⌉
· n
for any integer x. For example, Z2 = {0, 1}, Z3 = {−1, 0, 1}.
For any positive integers n and m with gcd(n,m) = 1, CRT(n,m) is the isomorphism from
Zn × Zm onto Znm, satisfying
(CRT(n,m)(a, b) mod n,CRT(n,m)(a, b) mod m) = (a, b)
for any (a, b) ∈ Zn × Zm.
In this thesis, the security parameter is always denoted as λ, and the expression
f(λ) = negl(λ)
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means that f(λ) is a negligible function, that is, for any c > 0, f satisfies
|f(λ)| ≤ λ−c
for all sufficiently large λ ∈ Z+.
Also, lg means the logarithm to base 2. And ∆(D1, D2) denotes the statistical distance
between two distributions D1 and D2.
2.2 Security assumptions
In this section we define security assumptions we are going to use in this thesis. In order to do
this, first let us define some distributions.
Definition 1. For any positive integers p, q0, ρ, let us define the following distributions.
D(p, q0, ρ) := {choose q $← [0, q0), r $← (−2ρ, 2ρ) : output pq + r},
Clearly, we can efficiently sample from the above distribution for any given parameters.
When a distribution is given as an input to an algorithm, it means that a sampling oracle
for the distribution is given; we use the same notation for a sampling oracle as that of the
distribution from which it samples.
Let PRIME be the set of all prime numbers and ROUGH(x) the set of all integers having
no prime factors less than x.
Definition 2 (Error-Free Approximate GCD Assumption). The (computational) (ρ, η, γ)-EF-AGCD
assumption is that, for any PPT adversary A, we have
Pr [A(ρ, η, γ, y0,D(p, q0, ρ)) = p] = negl(λ),
where p
$← [2η−1, 2η) ∩ PRIME, q0 $← [0, 2γ/p) ∩ ROUGH(2λ), and y0 = pq0.
The EF-AGCD assumption is suggested by Coron et al. [11] to prove the security of their
variant of the DGHV scheme [25].
There is also a decisional version of the EF-AGCD assumption, which is suggested by Cheon
at al. [9].
Definition 3 (Decisional Error-Free Approximate GCD Assumption). The decisional (ρ, η, γ)-EF-AGCD
assumption is that, for any PPT distinguisher D, we have∣∣∣Pr [D(ρ, η, γ, y0,D(p, q0, ρ), z) = 1 | z ← D(p, q0, ρ)]
− Pr
[
D(ρ, η, γ, y0,D(p, q0, ρ), z) = 1 | z $← Zy0
]∣∣∣
= negl(λ)
where p
$← [2η−1, 2η) ∩ PRIME, q0 $← [0, 2γ/p) ∩ ROUGH(2λ), and y0 = pq0.
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Recently, Coron et al. proved the equivalence of the EF-AGCD assumption and the decisional
EF-AGCD assumption in [10]. Later we will show that our scheme is IND-CPA under the
decisional EF-AGCD assumption. Therefore, the security of our scheme is based on the EF-
AGCD assumption, according to the equivalence.
2.3 Pseudo-Random Function
A pseudo-random function(PRF) is a basic primitive in cryptography. It can be used in a scheme
as a replacement for an ideal random function.
Definition 4. Let F : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}β(λ) be a family of efficiently computable func-
tions parameterized by λ for some polynomial β. F is pseudo-random if and only if, for any
PPT adversary Adv the difference of probabilities∣∣∣Pr [AdvF (k,·)(λ) = 1]− Pr [AdvR(·)(λ) = 1] ∣∣∣
is negligible in λ, where k
$← {0, 1}λ and R : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}β(λ) is a random function.
A PRF can be constructed from a one-way function, which is also a basic primitive in
cryptogrphy.[reference: Katz and Lindell] Thus, the existence of a one-way function implies the
existence of a PRF. And the existence of a one-way function is quite a mild assumption. In the
following, we assume that a pseudo-random function (PRF) F : {0, 1}λ×{0, 1}λ → {0, 1}β(λ) is
given for some polynomial β. For each k ∈ {0, 1}λ, we define a function Fk : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}β(λ)
as
Fk(x) := F (k, x), ∀x ∈ {0, 1}λ .
We need the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let F : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}β(λ) be a PRF for some polynomial β. For some
n ∈ Z+, define a function F ′ : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}λ → Zn as
F ′(k, x) := F (k, x) mod n, ∀(k, x) ∈ {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}λ .
Then F ′ is also a PRF if β − log n = ω(log λ).
Proof. Let β := β(λ). The set {0, 1}β can be identified with the set [0, 2β). Let X and Y be a
random variable uniformly distributed over [0, 2β) and [0, n), respectively. And define a random
variable Z := X mod n. We only need to show that ∆(X,Z) is negligible. We can easily find
the statistical distance by a direct computation.
∆(X,Z) = (2β mod n) ·
(
1
2β
·
⌈
2β
n
⌉
− 1
n
)
≤ n
2β
=
1
2β−logn
Therefore, the statistical distance is negligible if β − log n = ω(log λ). This completes the
proof.
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2.4 Labeled Program
First, let us define labeled programs, a concept first introduced in [14].
For each HAE, a set of admissible functions F is associated. In reality, F is not a set of
mathematical functions, but a set of representations of mathematical functions; an element f of
F is a concrete representation of a function which can be evaluated in polynomial time, and in
general, it is possible for two distinct representations f 6= f ′ to represent the same mathematical
function. It is required that any f ∈ F should represent a function of form f : Ml → M for
some l ∈ Z+ which depends on f . We will simply call an element f ∈ F an admissible function.
The number l is the arity of f .
A HAE encrypts a plaintext m ∈ M under a ‘label’ τ ∈ L, and a labeled program is
an admissible function together with information which plaintexts should be used as inputs.
Formally, a labeled program is a tuple P = (f, τ1, . . . , τl), where f ∈ F is an admissible function
f : Ml → M, and τi ∈ L are labels for i = 1, . . . , l for each input of f . The idea is that, if
mi are plaintexts encrypted under the label τi, respectively, then the evaluation of the labeled
program P = (f, τ1, . . . , τl) is f(m1, . . . ,ml).
We also define the identity labeled program with label τ , which is Iτ = (id, τ), where id :
M→M is the identity function and τ ∈ L is a label.
2.5 Arithmetic Circuits
We adapt the representation of arithmetic circuits as a model of computation, as Catalano and
Fiore have done in [8]. For a given ring R, an arithmetic circuit on R is an an acyclic directed
graph(DAG). Each vertex and each edge of a graph is called a gate and a wire of a circuit,
respectively. The in-degree and out-degree of a gate in a circuit is the number of inbound and
outbound wires, respectively. We impose the following restrictions on an acyclic directed graph.
• The graph is connected.
• The in-degree of each gate is either 0 or 2.
• There is a unique gate of out-degree 0.
A gate of in-degree 0 is either a constant gate or an input gate. A constant gate is constantly
evaluated as some fixed element in R. An input gate can be evaluated as arbitrary input x ∈ R.
A wire from some gate g1 to another gate g2 passes the value of g1 to g2. A gate of in-degree 2 is
either the addition gate or the multiplication gate, which represents the kind of operation taken
on values coming from two inbound wires. An evaluation of these gates is naturally the result
of the corresponding operation(either addition or multiplication) on values coming from two
inbound wires and this value is passed to another gates through outbound wires. The unique
gate of out-degree 0 is called an output gate, the value of which represents an output of the
entire circuit.
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The arity and the size of an arithmetic circuit is the number of input gates and entire gates
in the circuit, respectively. And the depth of an arithmetic circuit is the length of the longest
directed path from an input gate to an output gate in the circuit. We consider only arithmetic
circuit of polynomially bounded size, because such an arithmetic circuit can be evaluated in
polynomially bounded time.
Let f be an arithmetic circuit on R of arity l. f determines a unique l-variate polynomial
over R, considering each input gate of f as an indeterminate. We use the same notation f for
the polynomial determined by an arithmetic circuit f . The degree of an arithmetic circuit f is
defined by the degree as a polynomial. Also, f determines a function from Rl into R, considering
each input gate of f as a variable on R. By an evaluation of an arithmetic circuit f for any
input (x1, · · · , xl) ∈ Rl, we can get the function value f(x1, · · · , xl) ∈ R.
A labeled arithmetic circuit is an arithmetic circuit such that each input gate is labeled with
some bit-string distinct from elements in R. For an arithmetic circuit on R of arity l and l
number of bit-strings τ1, · · · , τl, a labeled arithmetic circuit f(τ1, · · · , τl) means that each i-th
input gate is labeled with a bit-string τi. This notation will not make a confusion with an
evaluation of f on (τ1, · · · , τl), since labels can be differentiated from elements in R.
2.6 Hash Tree
Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n be a collision-resistant hash function. We define the hash tree as in
[GW2013]. The hash tree fH of an arithmetic circuit f :Ml →M is a function from ({0, 1}∗)l
into {0, 1}n, which takes as input bitstrings xi ∈ {0, 1}∗ for each input wire of f . For each wire
w in the circuit f , we define the value of the hash tree fH(x1, . . . , xl) at w recursively:
• val(w) := H(xi), if w is the ith input wire of f .
• val(w) := H(val(w1), . . . , val(wt)), if w is the output wire of some gate with input wires
w1, . . . , wt.
We define the output of fH(x1, . . . , xl) as the val(wout) of the output wire wout of the circuit f .
For example, if f consists of only one gate, then fH(x1, · · · , xl) = H(H(x1), · · · , H(xl)).
Also, for each wire w in the circuit f , we define the index set ind(w) associated with the
wire w recursively:
• ind(w) := {i}, if w is the ith input wire of f .
• ind(w) := ind(w1) ∪ · · · ∪ ind(wt), if w is the output wire of some gate with input wires
w1, . . . , wt.
We say that the ith input wire of f is unused in f , if i 6∈ ind(wout). If the ith input wire is
unused, then the value of f does not depend on the ith input. If the ith input wire is not unused,
then we say that it is used in f .
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In this thesis, a circuit is a DAG where each vertex with positive indegree and positive
outdegree is assigned a gate, and there is a unique dedicated wire wout called the output wire.
In general, there might be many vertices with zero outdegree, but only one is the outgoing vertex
of wout. We use this definition to allow possibility of easily representing projection functions
pii :Ml →M, for example. But, under this definition, some input wires may be unused.
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Chapter 3
Homomorphic Secret-Key
Encryption
3.1 Definition
An HSE scheme is a tuple Π = (Gen,Enc,Eval,Dec) of the following four PPT algorithms.
• (ek , sk)← Gen(1λ): given a security parameter λ, Gen outputs a public evaluation key ek
and a secret key sk .
• c ← Enc(sk ,m): given a secret key sk and a plaintext m ∈ M, Enc outputs a ciphertext
c ∈ C.
• c ← Eval(ek , f, c1, · · · , cl): given an evaluation key ek , an arity-l admissible function
f : Ml → M in F and l ciphertexts c1, · · · , cl ∈ C, the deterministic algorithm Eval
outputs a ciphertext c ∈ C.
• m← Dec(sk , c): given a secret key sk and a ciphertext c ∈ C, the deterministic algorithm
Dec outputs a message m ∈M.
We assume that evaluation key ek implicitly contains the information about a plaintext space
M, a ciphertext space C and an admissible function space F . And both Eval and Dec are
deterministic algorithms.
Compactness.
In order to exclude trivial constructions, we require that there exists some c > 0 such that, for
any λ ∈ Z+, the output size of Eval(ek , · · · ) and Enc(sk , ·) are bounded by λc for any choice of
their input, when (ek , sk) ← Gen(1λ). That means that the ciphertext size is independent of
the choice of the admissible function f or the arity of f .
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Correctness.
An HSE scheme must satisfy the following two correctness properties.
• We should have
m = Dec(sk ,Enc(sk ,m)),
for any λ ∈ Z+ and m ∈M, when (ek , sk)← Gen(1λ).
• We should have
f(m1, . . . ,ml) = Dec(sk , c),
for any λ ∈ Z+, f ∈ F , mi ∈ M for i = 1, . . . , l, when (ek , sk) ← Gen(1λ), ci ←
Enc(sk ,mi) for i = 1, . . . , l, and c← Eval(ek , f, c1, . . . , cl).
3.2 Security Notions
The goal of an HSE scheme is the privacy as same as a secret-key encryption scheme. To define
a security notion of indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA), we use the
following security game IND-CPAΠ,A for an HSE scheme Π between the challenger and the
adversary A, which is a natural adaptation of the corresponding security game of the secret-key
encryption.
Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attack (IND-CPA)
IND-CPAΠ,A(1
λ):
Initialization. A key pair (ek , sk)← Gen(1λ) is generated and then ek is given to
A.
Queries. A may make encryption queries adaptively. For each encryption query m
of A, the challenger returns the answer c← Enc(sk ,m) to A.
Challenge. A outputs the challenge (m∗0,m∗1). The challenger flips a coin b
$← {0, 1}
and then gives the corresponding challenge ciphertext c∗ ← Enc(sk ,m∗b) to A.
Queries. Again A may make encryption queries adaptively, and such queries are
answered precisely as before.
Finalization. A outputs a bit b′, and then the challenger returns 1 if b = b′, and 0
otherwise.
The advantage of A in the game IND-CPA for the scheme Π is defined as
AdvIND-CPAΠ,A (λ) :=
∣∣∣∣Pr [IND-CPAΠ,A(1λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
We say that an HSE scheme Π satisfies IND-CPA, if the advantage AdvIND-CPAΠ,A (λ) is negligible
for any PPT adversary A.
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3.3 Construction
As a concrete example of an HSE, we give a description of a secret-key version of somewhat
homomorphic public-key encryption proposed [11]. Actually, our construction of a homomorphic
authentication encryption in Chapter 5 is just a simple variant of the following HSE scheme. In
this scheme, the plaintext space is the ring ZQ, where the modulus Q can be chosen arbitrarily
in the set [2, 2λ) and a function is represented as an arithmetic circuit on ZQ.
Scheme The HSE scheme HSECMNT := (Gen,Enc,Eval,Dec) is defined as follows.
(pp, sk)← Gen(1λ, Q)
Given a security parameter λ and a modulus Q, let η := η(λ), γ := γ(λ) and
ρ := ρ(λ). Choose a random prime integer p in the set [2η−1, 2η) and a random
2λ
2
-rough integer n in the set [0, 2
γ
p ). Let N := pn. The public parameters
pp := (λ, η, γ, ρ,Q,N) and the secret key sk := (p, n). Note that gcd(p,Q) = 1
since p is a prime integer larger than Q if η > λ+ 1.
c← Enc(sk ,m)
Given a secret key sk = (p, n) and a plaintext m ∈ ZQ, choose two random
integers r and s in the sets [0, 2ρ) and [0, n), respectively. The ciphertext
c := CRT(p,n)(rQ+ x, s) ∈ ZN .
c← Eval(f, c1, · · · , cl)
Given an arithmetic circuit f of arity l and l ciphertexts c1, · · · , cl ∈ ZN , the
evaluated ciphertext c := f(c1, · · · , cl) mod N ∈ ZN .
y ← Dec(sk , c)
Given a secret key sk = (p, n) and a ciphertext c ∈ ZN , the decrypted plaintext
m := (c mod p) mod Q ∈ ZQ.
In this scheme, the plaintext space is ZQ and the ciphertext space is ZN . The length of
a ciphertext is always γ and so the scheme clearly satisfies the compactness. The set F of
admissible functions will be determined by the following argument on correctness.
Correctness Let pp := (λ, η, γ, ρ,Q,N) and sk = (p, n), where N := pn and Q ∈ [2, 2λ). And
let f be an l-arity arithmetic circuit of depth d for some positive integers l and d. For any l
plaintexts m1, · · · ,ml ∈ ZQ, let ci ← Enc(sk ,mi), i = 1, · · · , l. Then ci mod p = riQ + mi and
ri ∈ [0, 2ρ) for each i = 1, · · · , l. And c˜ := Eval(f, c1, · · · , cl) = f(c1, · · · , cl) mod N . So
c˜ mod p = f(c1 mod p, · · · , cl mod p) mod p
= f(r1Q+m1, · · · , rlQ+ml) mod p
= f(r1Q+m1, · · · , rlQ+ml)
13
if f(r1Q+m1, · · · , rlQ+ml) < p. Then
Dec(sk , c˜) = (c˜ mod p) mod Q
= f(r1Q+m1, · · · , rlQ+ml) mod Q
= f(x1, · · · ,ml) mod Q.
Thus, the correctness property holds if 2d < η−1λ+ρ , that is, d < log(
η−1
λ+ρ) since the length of an
output is
log f(r1Q+m1, · · · , rlQ+ml) ≤ 2d(λ+ ρ) ≤ η − 1.
In other words, f is admissible if the depth of f is d < log( η−1λ+ρ). The scheme is somewhat
homomorphic since the depth of an admissible arithmetic circuit is logarithmically bounded.
Parameters In the scheme, the parameters ρ, η and γ are given as follows.
• ρ := λ to resist the brute force attack on the EF-AGCD problem.
• η := λc · (ρ + λ) = O(λc+1) to compute an arithmetic circuit of depth log λc for some
constant c ≥ 1. Then η = Ω(λ2) and so it resists known factoring attacks.
• γ := η2λ = O(λ2c+3) to resist known attacks on the EF-AGCD problem.
3.4 Security Proof
Theorem 1. The scheme HSECMNT is IND-CPA under the decisional (η, γ, ρ)-EF-AGCD ass-
sumption.
Proof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A for the game IND-CPA such that
Pr
[
IND-CPAA(1
λ, Q) = 1
]
≥ 1/2 + (λ)
for some Q ∈ [2, 2λ) and some non-negligible function . Then, we can construct a PPT distin-
guisher D for the decisional (η, γ, ρ)-EF-AGCD problem, by simulating the game IND-CPAA as
follows.
Distinguisher D(η, γ, ρ,N,D(p, n, ρ), z)
Initialization
Give pp := (λ, η, γ, ρ,Q,N) to A.
Queries before Challenge
For each encryption query m ∈ ZQ of A, sample u from the given distribution
D(p, n, ρ) and give c := (uQ+m) mod N to A as an answer for the query.
Challenge
For the challenge (m∗0,m∗1) of A, choose a random bit b, give c∗ := (zQ +
m∗b) mod N to A as a challenge ciphertext.
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Queries after Challenge
For each encryption query m ∈ ZQ of A, sample u from the given distribution
D(p, n, ρ) and give c := (uQ+m) mod N to A as an answer for the query.
Finalization For the output b′ of A, return 1 if b = b′. Otherwise, return 0.
Note that gcd(N,Q) = 1. Let us consider the distribution of c produced by D in the query
phase. Since c = uQ+m mod N where u← D(p, n, ρ), we have
c = (sp+ r)Q+m mod N ; r ∈ [0, 2ρ), s ∈ [0, n)
= sQp+ (rQ+m) mod N
= s′p+ (rQ+m) mod N ; s′ = sQ mod n
Therefore, c mod p = rQ+m and s′ is uniform distributed over Zn. So, the distribution of c is
identical to that of a real ciphertext and the encryption oracle can be simulated using D(p, n, ρ).
Now, consider the distribution of c∗ in the Challenge phase. If z ← D(p, n, ρ), then the
distribution of c∗ is identical to that of original security game by the same reason as the above.
But if z
$← ZN , then c∗ is also uniformly distributed over ZN regardless of a random bit b. Thus,
c∗ does not contain any information on the challenge plaintext mb in case that z
$← ZN . So
Pr [D(ρ, η, γ,N,D(p, n, ρ), z) = 1 | z ← D(p, n, ρ)] = Pr
[
IND-CPAA(1
λ, Q) = 1
]
≥ 1
2
+ (λ)
and
Pr
[
D(η, γ, ρ,N,D(p, n, ρ), z) = 1 | z $← ZN
]
=
1
2
Therefore, the advantage of D is at least non-negligible , and this completes the proof.
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Chapter 4
Homomorphic message
authentication
4.1 Definition
An HMA scheme is a tuple Π = (Gen,Auth,Eval,Verify) of the following four PPT algorithms.
• (ek , sk)← Gen(1λ): given a security parameter λ, Gen outputs a public evaluation key ek
and a secret key sk .
• σ ← Auth(sk , τ,m): given a secret key sk , a label τ ∈ L and a message m ∈ M, Auth
outputs a tag σ ∈ T for the message m.
• σ ← Eval(ek , f, σ1, · · · , σl): given an evaluation key ek , an arity-l admissible function
f :Ml →M in F and l tags σ1, · · · , σl ∈ T , Eval outputs a tag σ ∈ T .
• b← Verify(sk , (f, τ1, · · · , τl),m, σ): given a secret key sk , a labeled program (f, τ1, · · · , τl),
a message mˆ ∈M and a tag σ ∈ T , Verify outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
We assume that evaluation key ek implicitly contains the information about a message space
M, a tag space T , a label space L and an admissible function space F . And both Eval and
Verify are deterministic algorithms.
Compactness.
In order to exclude trivial constructions, we require that there exists some c > 0 such that, for
any λ ∈ Z+, the output size of Eval(ek , · · · ) and Auth(sk , ·, ·) are bounded by λc for any choice
of their input, when (ek , sk) ← Gen(1λ). That means that the tag size is independent of the
choice of the admissible function f or the arity of f .
Correctness.
An HMA scheme must satisfy the following two correctness properties.
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• We should have
1 = Verify(sk , Iτ ,m,Auth(sk , τ,m)),
for any λ ∈ Z+, τ ∈ L and m ∈M, when (ek , sk)← Gen(1λ).
• We should have
1 = Verify(sk , (f, τ1, · · · , τl), f(m1, . . . ,ml), σ),
for any λ ∈ Z+, f ∈ F , τi ∈ L, mi ∈ M for i = 1, . . . , l, when (ek , sk) ← Gen(1λ),
σi ← Auth(sk , τi,mi) for i = 1, . . . , l, and σ ← Eval(ek , f, σ1, . . . , σl).
Constant testability.
Given an HMA Π, an admissible function f : Ml → M of arity l, a subset I of the index set
{1, · · · , l}, messages (mi)i∈I ∈ M|I|, and their corresponding tags (σi)i∈I ∈ T |I|, consider the
following functions:
m˜f,(mi)i∈I := f(mi)i∈I
σ˜f,(σi)i∈I := Eval(ek , f, (σi)i∈I).
More explicitly, m˜f,(mi)i∈I is a function from Ml−|I| to M defined by
m˜f,(mi)i∈I (mj)j 6∈I := f(m1, · · · ,ml),
for any (mj)j 6∈I ∈Ml−|I|. And σ˜f,(σi)i∈I is a function from T l−|I| to T defined by
σ˜f,(σi)i∈I (σj)j 6∈I := Eval(ek , f, σ1, · · · , σl),
That is, messages or tags for indices in I are fixed, and messages or tags for indices in {1, . . . , l}\I
are considered as variables. In short, m˜ = m˜f,(mi)i∈I and σ˜ = σ˜f,(σi)i∈I are partially evaluated
functions. In particular, m˜f,(mi)i∈I and σ˜f,(σi)i∈I are constant functions if I = {1, . . . , l}.
We may need to determine whether such a function m˜ = m˜f,(mi)i∈I or σ˜f,(σi)i∈I is constant
or not. So we define a property called ‘constant testability’ as follows. Depending whether we
are working on messages or tags, we define two versions of constant testability accordingly.
Definition 5. We say that a HMA scheme Π satisfies the message constant testability (MCT)
if there exists a PPT algorithm that determines if the function m˜ = m˜f,(mi)i∈I is constant or
not with overwhelming probability, for any evaluation key ek generated by Π.Gen, any admissible
function f :Ml →M of arity l, any subset I of the index set {1, · · · , l} and any (mi)i∈I ∈M|I|.
Definition 6. We say that a HMA scheme Π satisfies the tag constant testability (TCT) if
there exists a PPT algorithm that determines if the function σ˜f,(σi)i∈I is constant or not with
overwhelming probability, for any evaluation key ek generated by Π.Gen, any admissible function
f :Ml →M of arity l, any subset I of the index set {1, · · · , l} and any (σi)i∈I ∈ T |I|.
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When the set of admissible functions supported by a HMA is simple, both MCT and TCT
may be satisfied. But, the message constant testability might be a difficult property to be satis-
fied in general; for example, if a HMA supports general boolean circuits, then MCT implies that
the CIRCUIT-SAT problem can be solved in polynomial time with overwhelming probability,
therefore the polynomial hierarchy PH collapses.
On the other hand, we claim that a HMA to satisfy the tag constant testability is a relatively
mild requirement: unlike the message spaceM, often the tag space T might be a large ring, and
σ˜f,(σi)i∈I is a polynomial on the ring T , in which case we may use the Schwartz-Zippel lemma
to perform the polynomial identity testing. This applies to our HMA scheme to be presented in
this thesis, as shown in Theorem 16.
Moreover, we show that if Π is a HMA which does not necessarily satisfy TCT, then there is
a simple generic transformation which turns it into another HMA Π′ which satisfies TCT, while
preserving original security properties satisfied by Π. This will be shown in Theorems 13, 14
and 15. Without loss of generality, we assume the TCT property to be an additional requirement
for a HMA to satisfy.
4.2 Security Notions
The goal of an HMA scheme is the authenticity as same as a message authentication. To define
a security game for authenticity of an HMA scheme, we consider two possible attack models;
one is the chosen-message attack (CMA) and the other is the chosen-tag attack (CTA). In the
CMA, we allow that an adversary adaptively makes authentication queries. In the CTA, we
allow that an adversary adaptively makes not only authentication queries but also verification
queries. There is one trivial restriction on authentication queries; a label used to generate a tag
for some message can not be used again to generate a tag for another message. In other words,
for each label τ ∈ L, either τ is used, that is, there exists a unique message m ∈ M such that
exactly one tag σ ∈ T has generated by the authentication algorithm Auth(sk , τ,m), or not
used. To prevent a used label from being reused in the authentication algorithm Auth, we can
maintain a history of authentication queries as follows.
Authentication History An authentication history H : L → {⊥} ∪ (M× T ) is a function,
which is dynamically changed as authentication queries made by an adversary.
• At first, H is initialized as constantly ⊥. That is, H(τ) = ⊥ for all τ ∈ L.
• For each authentication query (τ,m) ∈ L ×M, if τ is new, that is, H(τ) = ⊥, then the
query is accepted and we update H(τ) := (m,σ), where σ ← Auth(sk , τ,m). Otherwise,
if τ is used, that is, H(τ) 6= ⊥, then the query is rejected.
In the following, we assume that an adversary does not make an authentication query for a used
label.
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The goal of an adversary in a security game for authenticity is to make a forgery. We define
a forgery as follows.
Forgery Let ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), mˆ, σˆ) be a forgery attempt given by an adversary. It is a forgery
if and only if 1 = Verify(sk , (f, τ1, · · · , τl), mˆ, σˆ) and satisfies one of the following two conditions.
• m˜f,(mi)i∈I is not constant; a forgery of type 1.
• m˜f,(mi)i∈I is constantly m˜ but m˜ 6= mˆ; a forgery of type 2.
where I is the set of indices of used labels in τ1, · · · , τl.
Also, we define a strong forgery to obtain a notion of a stronger security,
Strong Forgery Let ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), mˆ, σˆ) be a forgery attempt given by an adversary. It is a
strong forgery if and only if 1 = Verify(sk , (f, τ1, · · · , τl), mˆ, σˆ) and satisfies one of the following
two conditions.
• Either m˜f,(mi)i∈I or σ˜f,(σi)i∈I is not constant; a strong forgery of type 1.
• m˜f,(mi)i∈I is constantly m˜ and σ˜f,(σi)i∈I is constantly σ˜ but (m˜, σ˜) 6= (mˆ, σˆ); a strong
forgery of type 2.
where I is the set of indices of used labels in τ1, · · · , τl.
Now, we can define four security notions, UF-CMA, SUF-CMA, UF-CTA and SUF-CTA.
Unforgeability under Chosen Message Attack (UF-CMA)
UF-CMAA(1
λ):
Initialization
Given a security parameter λ, generate a pair (pp, sk)← Gen(1λ). Give pp to
A.
Queries
A can make authentication queries adaptively. For each authentication query
(τ,m) of A, give σ ← Auth(sk , τ,m) to A as an answer for the query.
Finalization
For the forgery attempt ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), mˆ, σˆ) of A, if it is indeed a forgery, then
output 1. Otherwise, output 0.
The advantage of A in the game UF-CMA is defined as
AdvUF-CMAA (1
λ) := Pr
[
UF-CMAA(1
λ) = 1
]
We say that an HMA satisfies UF-CMA, if AdvUF-CMAA (1
λ) is negligible for any PPT adversary
A.
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Strong Unforgeability under Chosen Message Attack (SUF-CMA)
SUF-CMAA(1
λ):
Initialization
Given a security parameter λ, generate a pair (pp, sk)← Gen(1λ). Give pp to
A.
Queries
A can make authentication queries adaptively. For each authentication query
(τ,m) of A, give σ ← Auth(sk , τ,m) to A as an answer for the query.
Finalization
For the forgery attempt ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), mˆ, σˆ) of A, if it is indeed a strong forgery,
then output 1. Otherwise, output 0.
The advantage of A in the game SUF-CMA is defined as
AdvSUF-CMAA (1
λ) := Pr
[
SUF-CMAA(1
λ) = 1
]
We say that an HMA satisfies SUF-CMA, if AdvSUF-CMAA (1
λ) is negligible for any PPT adversary
A.
Unforgeability under Chosen Tag Attack (UF-CTA)
UF-CTAA(1
λ):
Initialization
Given a security parameter λ, generate a pair (pp, sk)← Gen(1λ). Give pp to
A.
Queries
A can make authentication queries and verification queries adaptively. For
each authentication query (τ,m) of A, give σ ← Auth(sk , τ,m) to A as an
answer for the query. For each verification query ((f, τ1, · · · , τl),m, σ) of A,
give b← Verify(sk , (f, τ1, · · · , τl),m, σ) to A as an answer for the query.
Finalization
For the forgery attempt ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), mˆ, σˆ) of A, if it is indeed a forgery, then
output 1. Otherwise, output 0.
The advantage of A in the game UF-CTA is defined as
AdvUF-CTAA (1
λ) := Pr
[
UF-CTAA(1
λ) = 1
]
We say that an HMA satisfies UF-CTA, if AdvUF-CTAA (1
λ) is negligible for any PPT adversary
A.
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Strong Unforgeability under Chosen Tag Attack (SUF-CTA)
SUF-CTAA(1
λ):
Initialization
Given a security parameter λ, generate a pair (pp, sk)← Gen(1λ). Give pp to
A.
Queries
A can make authentication queries and verification queries adaptively. For
each authentication query (τ,m) of A, give σ ← Auth(sk , τ,m) to A as an
answer for the query. For each verification query ((f, τ1, · · · , τl),m, σ) of A,
give b← Verify(sk , (f, τ1, · · · , τl),m, σ) to A as an answer for the query.
Finalization
For the forgery attempt ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), mˆ, σˆ) of A, if it is indeed a strong forgery,
then output 1. Otherwise, output 0.
The advantage of A in the game SUF-CTA is defined as
AdvSUF-CTAA (1
λ) := Pr
[
SUF-CTAA(1
λ) = 1
]
We say that an HMA satisfies SUF-CTA, if AdvSUF-CTAA (1
λ) is negligible for any PPT adversary
A.
4.3 Relations on Security Notions
In this section, we prove some relations on four security notions, UF-CMA, UF-CTA, SUF-CMA
and SUF-CTA, which are defined in the previous section. First, we have trivial implication.
Theorem 2. UF-CTA implies UF-CMA. And SUF-CTA implies SUF-CMA.
Proof. In chosen-message attack (CMA), an adversary can make only authentication queries.
But an adversary can make both authentication queries and verification queries in chosen-tag
attack (CTA). Clearly, a stronger power is given to an adversary in CTA than in CMA. So, a
security notion in CTA is stronger than that in CMA.
Theorem 3. SUF-CMA implies UF-CMA. And SUF-CTA implies UF-CTA.
Proof. By definition, a forgery is a strong forgery. Thus, an adversary that can not produce a
strong forgery, can not produce a forgery.
The following is the main theorem in this section.
Theorem 4. SUF-CMA together with TCT imply SUF-CTA.
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Proof. We prove the theorem by a hybrid argument to transform the game SUF-CTA into
another game that is essentially the same as the game SUF-CMA.
Let A be any PPT adversary for the game SUF-CTA. Without loss of generality, we may
assume that A makes exactly q = q(λ) number of verification queries. For each k ∈ {0, . . . , q},
define SUF-CTAk to be the game that is identical to SUF-CTA except that the first k verification
queries are answered by the following verification simulation.
Verification Simulation
For a verification query ((f, τ1, · · · , τl),m, σ) of A, let I be the set of indices of used labels
in τ1, · · · , τl. If σ˜f,(σi)i∈I is constantly σ and m˜f,(mi)i∈I (mj)j /∈I = m for (mj)j /∈I
$←Ml−|I|,
then give 1 to A as an answer for the query. Otherwise, give 0 as an answer for the query.
Clearly, SUF-CTA0 is equal to the original security game SUF-CTA. So,
AdvSUF-CTA
0
A (λ) = Adv
SUF-CTA
A (λ).
And, note that the verification simulation does not use any secret information and is efficiently
computable by the TCT property. So, the adversary A does not obtain any useful information
by the verification queries at all in the game SUF-CTAq. Formally, we can easily construct an
adversary A′ which plays SUF-CMA game and makes the same number of encryption queries
as A does, and satisfying
AdvSUF-CTA
q
A (λ) = Adv
SUF-CMA
A′ (λ).
For each k ∈ {1, . . . , q}, the difference between AdvSUF-CTAk−1A (λ) and AdvSUF-CTA
k
A (λ) is
bounded by the probability that the verification simulation on the k-th verification query made
by A fails (that is, is different from the real verification). Let us show that the verification
simulation fails for the verification query tˆ := ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), mˆ, σˆ) only if tˆ is a strong forgery.
If so, we may construct a PPT adversary A′′ for the game SUF-CMA using the ith verification
query made by A. Specifically, A′′ runs the adversary A until it makes the ith verification query,
while answering the authentication queries using its own authentication queries and answering
the previous verification queries by the verification simulation. Then A′′ aborts the running of
A, and outputs the ith verification query of A as its own forgery attempt. So, we can conclude
that ∣∣∣AdvSUF-CTAi−1Π,A (λ)−AdvSUF-CTAiΠ,A (λ) ∣∣∣ ≤ AdvSUF-CMAΠ,A′′ (λ) = negl(λ).
For a verification query tˆ := ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), mˆ, σˆ), suppose that σ˜ := Eval(ek , f, (σi)i∈I) is
nonconstant. In this case, verification simulation fails if and only if Verify(sk , tˆ) = 1. So tˆ
is a strong forgery if verification simulation fails since Verify(sk , tˆ) = 1 and σ˜ is nonconstant.
On the another hand, suppose that σ˜ is constant. By the correctness, Verify(sk , t˜) = 1, where
t˜ := ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), m˜, σ˜). If (m˜, σ˜) = (mˆ, σˆ), then t˜ = tˆ and Verify(sk , tˆ) = 1. In this case,
verification simulation is exact. But, if (m˜, σ˜) 6= (mˆ, σˆ), then verification simulation fails if and
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only if Verify(sk , tˆ) = 1. So tˆ is a strong forgery if verification simulation fails since Verify(sk , tˆ) =
1 and σ˜ is constant but (m˜, σ˜) 6= (mˆ, σˆ).
Therefore,
AdvSUF-CTA
0
Π,A (λ) ≤ AdvSUF-CTA
q
Π,A (λ) +
q∑
i=1
∣∣∣AdvSUF-CTAiΠ,A (λ)−AdvSUF-CTAi−1Π,A (λ) ∣∣∣
≤ AdvSUF-CMAΠ,A′ (λ) +
q∑
i=1
AdvSUF-CMAΠ,A′′ (λ)
≤ (q + 1) ·AdvSUF-CMAΠ (λ)
= negl(λ).
For any PPT adversary Adv, ASUF-CTAΠ,A (λ) = Adv
SUF-CTA0
Π,A (λ) is negligible since Adv
SUF-CMA
Π (λ)
is negligible. This completes the proof.
4.4 Generic Transformation to TCT
Suppose that Π is a HMA which is not necessarily tag constant testable. We describe a generic
construction that transforms a HMA Π into another HMA Π′ satisfying TCT while preserving
SUF-CMA of the original scheme Π. Our construction is based on the Merkle hash tree technique
used by Gennaro and Wichs. For concreteness, here we assume that Π represents admissible
functions as arithmetic circuits. In such a case, we also assume that Eval function becomes an
arithmetic circuit on the tag space.
Now, using a pseudo-random function F and a family H of collision-resistant hash functions,
we can transform a HMA scheme Π = (Gen,Auth,Eval,Verify) to another HMA scheme Π′ =
(Gen′,Auth′,Eval′,Verify′) as follows.
Scheme Π′ = (Gen′,Auth′,Eval′,Verify′):
• (pp′, sk ′) ← Gen′(1λ): Generate keys (pp, sk) ← Gen(1λ) and k $← {0, 1}λ and
H
$← H. Return pp′ := (pp, H) and sk ′ := (sk , k).
• σ′ ← Auth′(sk ′, τ,m): Let h := H(Fk(τ)) and σ ← Auth(sk , τ,m). Return
σ′ := (h, σ).
• σ′ ← Eval′(f, σ′1, · · · , σ′l): Let f :Ml →M be a circuit. For each i = 1, · · · , l,
parse σ′i as (hi, σi). Let h := f
H(h1, · · · , hl) and σ ← Eval(f, σ1, · · · , σl). Re-
turn σ′ := (h, σ).
• b ← Verify′(sk ′, (f, τ1, · · · , τl),m, σ′): Let f : Ml → M be a circuit. Parse σ′
as (h, σ). For each i = 1, · · · , l, let hi := H(Fk(τi)). If h = fH(h1, · · · , hl) and
1 = Verify(sk , (f, τ1, · · · , τl),m, σ), then return 1. Otherwise, return 0.
Above, we assume that Fk : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}λ and H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ.
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Π′ and Π share the same message space M, the same label space L and the same set F of
admissible functions. And the tag space of Π′ is {0, 1}λ×T , where T is the ciphertext space of Π.
The correctness and compactness of Π′ can easily be concluded from that of Π. Below, we show
that the constructed scheme Π′ satisfies the TCT property, and also this generic transformation
preserves SUF-CMA.
Theorem 5. The HMA scheme Π′ satisfies TCT.
Proof. Let f : Ml → M be an admissible function of arity l, I a subset of the index set
{1, . . . , l}, (mi)i∈I ∈ M|I| and (σ′i)i∈I = (hi, σi)i∈I ∈ ({0, 1}λ × T )|I| some messages and their
corresponding tags. Consider the function σ˜′f,(σ′i)i∈I : ({0, 1}λ × T )l−|I| → {0, 1}λ × T . Then
σ˜′f,(σ′i)i∈I = Eval
′(f, (hi, σi)i∈I) = (fH(hi)i∈I ,Eval(f, (σi)i∈I)).
The above expression c˜′ is a function of the values for the ‘missing’ indices: (hi)i 6∈I and (ci)i 6∈I .
If I = {1, . . . , l}, then σ˜′f,(σ′i)i∈I is clearly constant. Now, suppose that there exist an index
i ∈ {1, . . . , l} such that i /∈ I. Since the underlying hash function H is collision-resistant, the
hash tree fH cannot be constant on each variable except with negligible probability. So, σ˜′f,(σ′i)i∈I
is not constant except with negligible probability regardless of the scheme Π. This means that
we can trivially determine if σ˜′f,(σ′i)i∈I is constant or not. Therefore, Π
′ satisfies TCT.
Theorem 6. If Π is SUF-CMA, then Π′ is also SUF-CMA.
Proof. Let A′ be a PPT adversary engaged in the security game SUF-CMAΠ′,A′ . Using A′, we
construct a PPT adversary A for the security game SUF-CMAΠ,A which simulates the game
SUF-CMAΠ′,A′ .
Adversary A(1λ):
Initialization. Given pp in the scheme Π, the adversary A picks H
$← H, k $←
{0, 1}λ, and gives pp′ := (pp, H) to A′. And A keeps the PRF key k by himself.
Queries. Whenever A′ makes an authentication query (τ,m), A makes the same
authentication query. Receiving the answer σ, the adversary A computes h :=
H(Fk(τ)), A gives σ
′ := (h, σ) to A′ as an answer for the query.
Forgery. Given a forgery attempt ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), mˆ, (hˆ, σˆ)) output by A′, A outputs
((f, τ1, · · · , τl), mˆ, σˆ).
Now, let us show that if the forgery attempt ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), mˆ, (hˆ, σˆ)) of A′ is a strong forgery
for SUF-CMAΠ′,A′ , then ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), mˆ, σˆ) is also a strong forgery for SUF-CMAΠ,A, except
with negligible probability. Let I be the set of indices i ∈ {1, . . . , l} such that (τi,mi, ci) ∈ S.
Since ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ′) is valid in Π′, ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ) is also valid in Π. Also, we have
fH(H(Fk(τ1)), · · · , H(Fk(τl))) = hˆ.
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Suppose I 6= {1, . . . , l}, and assume there exists at least an index j 6∈ I which is used in the
circuit f . In this case, we claim that fH(H(Fk(τ1)), · · · , H(Fk(τl))) = hˆ only with negligible
probability. Since j is new, Fk(τj) is computationally indistinguishable to a random number
rj
$← {0, 1}λ. Due to the collision resistance of H, the probability
Pr
[
fH(H(Fk(τ1)), · · · , rj , · · · , H(Fk(τl))) = hˆ
∣∣∣ rj $← {0, 1}λ]
should be negligible. So, fH(H(Fk(τ1)), · · · , H(Fk(τl))) = hˆ holds only with negligible probabil-
ity. Therefore, since we already have fH(H(Fk(τ1)), · · · , H(Fk(τl))) = hˆ, we may assume with
negligible exception that any i 6∈ I is unused in the circuit f . In this case, both c˜′ and c˜ are
constants, where
c˜′ = (h˜, c˜),
with
h˜ := fH((H(Fk(τi)))i∈I), c˜ = Eval(ek , f, (ci)i∈I).
But then ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ′) must be a strong forgery of type 2. So we have
cˆ′ = (hˆ, cˆ) 6= (hˆ, c˜) = c˜′.
Therefore, cˆ 6= c˜, and ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ) is a strong forgery of type 2 for Π. This shows that
AdvSUF-CPAΠ′,A′ (λ) ≤ AdvSUF-CPAΠ,A (λ) = negl(λ).
Hence Π′ is SUF-CMA.
4.5 Construction
In this section, we describe the HMA scheme given in [21] and prove its security of SUF-CTA
in the next section.
Scheme
We assume that a PRF F : {0, 1}λ×{0, 1}λ → {0, 1}β(λ) ∼= [0, 2β(λ)) is given for some polynomial
β. The message space is ZQ, where the modulus Q can be chosen arbitrarily in the set [2, 2λ).
The HMA scheme HMAJY := (Gen,Auth,Eval,Verify) is defined as follows.
(pp, sk)← Gen(1λ, Q)
Given a security parameter λ and a modulus Q, let γ := γ(λ) and β := β(λ).
Choose a random prime integer p in the set [2λ, 2λ+1) and a random string k
in the set {0, 1}λ. Let Fk := F (k, ·) : {0, 1}λ → [0, 2β). The set of public
parameters pp := (λ, γ, β, F,Q) and the secret key sk := (p, k). Note that
gcd(p,Q) = 1 since p is a prime integer larger than Q.
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σ ← Auth(sk , τ, x)
Given a secret key sk = (p, k), a label τ ∈ {0, 1}λ and a message x ∈ ZQ,
compute a := CRT(p,Q)(s, x) where s := Fk(τ) mod p. Choose a random integer
r in the set [0, 2
γ
pQ). The tag σ := rpQ+ a ∈ Z.
σ˜ ← Eval(f, σ1, · · · , σl)
Given an arithmetic circuit f of arity l and l tags σ1, · · · , σl ∈ Z, the evaluated
tag σ˜ := f(σ1, · · · , σl) in the integer ring Z.
b← Verify(sk , f(τ1, · · · , τl), y, σ˜)
Given a secret key sk = (p, k), a labeled arithmetic circuit f(τ1, · · · , τl), a
message y ∈ ZQ and a tag σ˜ ∈ Z, compute v := f(Fk(τ1) mod p, · · · , Fk(τl) mod
p) mod p. If v = σ˜ mod p and y = σ˜ mod Q, then b := 1. Otherwise, b := 0.
The message space is ZQ and the tag space is Z and the label space is {0, 1}λ. And the
set F is arithmetic circuits of depth d, where d(λ) is logarithmically bounded. So the scheme
HMAJY is somewhat homomorphic. Note that the evaluation algorithm Eval and the verification
algorithm Verify are deterministic.
Correctness Let pp := (λ, β, F,Q) and sk = (p, k) where Q ∈ [2, 2λ). And let f be an arith-
metic circuit of arity l for some positive integer l. For each i = 1, · · · , l, let σi ← Auth(sk , τi, xi)
where xi ∈ ZQ and τi ∈ {0, 1}λ. Then, for each i = 1, · · · , l, σi mod p = Fk(τi) mod p and
σi mod Q = xi. Let σ˜ := Eval(f, σ1, · · · , σl), then σ˜ = f(σ1, · · · , σl). So,
σ˜ mod p = f(σ1 mod p, · · · , σl mod p) mod p
= f(Fk(τ1) mod p, · · · , Fk(τl) mod p) mod p
= v
and
σ˜ mod Q = f(σ1 mod Q, · · · , σl mod Q) mod Q
= f(x1, · · · , xl) mod Q.
Therefore, the correctness holds for any arithmetic circuit.
Parameters In the scheme, the parameters γ, β and d are given as follows.
• γ := 3λ to satisfy the condition γ − 2λ = ω(log λ) in the security proof.
• β := 2λ to obtain a PRF with codomain Zp for any p of length λ.
• d := log λc for some constant c ≥ 1 to satisfy the compactness. The length of tags is at
most 2dγ = 3λc+1.
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4.6 Security Proof
In this section, we prove that the scheme HMAJY is fully secure, that is, SUF-CTA. We need
the following two theorems, HMAJY is TCT and SUF-CMA.
Theorem 7. The scheme HMAJY satisfies TCT.
Proof. Let ek be an evaluation key generated by Gen(1λ, Q) for some λ ∈ Z+ and a modulus Q,
f any admissible arity-l arithmetic circuit for some l ∈ Z+ and (σi)i∈I any element in Z| I | for
some subset I of the index set {1, · · · , l}. We construct an algorithm ALG-TCT that determines
if σ˜ = Eval(ek , f, (σi)i∈I) is constant or not with overwhelming probability, as follows.
procedure ALG-CCT(ek , f , (σi)i∈I):
if I = {1, · · · , l} then
return 1
else
(σ0j )j /∈I , (σ
1
j )j /∈I
$← (Z)l−| I |
if σ˜(σ0j )j /∈I = σ˜(σ
1
j )j /∈I then
return 1
else
return 0
The algorithm ALG-TCT is essentially the usual probabilistic polynomial identity testing.
In the scheme Π, σ˜ can be considered as an (l − | I |)-variate polynomial over Z of degree not
greater than deg f . We have
σ˜ = f(σi)i∈I : Zl−|I| → Z
In case I = {1, · · · , l}, σ˜ is clearly constant and the algorithm outputs 1 correctly. In case
I ( {1, · · · , l}, consider the function σ˜′ := σ˜ − σ˜(σ0j )j /∈I mod y0 for any (σ0j )j /∈I ∈ Zl−| I |. If
σ˜ is constant, then σ˜′ is constantly zero and σ˜′(σ1j )j /∈I = σ˜(σ
1
j )j /∈I − σ˜(σ0j )j /∈I = 0 for any
(σ1j )j /∈I ∈ Zl−| I |. So, σ˜(σ0j )j /∈I = σ˜(σ1j )j /∈I and the algorithm outputs 1 correctly. If σ˜ is not
constant, then σ˜′ is not constantly zero and the algorithm outputs the incorrect answer 1 when
σ˜(σ0j )j /∈I ≡ σ˜(σ1j )j /∈I , that is, σ˜′(σ1j )j /∈I = 0. This is the only case that the algorithm outputs an
incorrect answer. So the error probability of the algorithm is
Pr
[
σ˜′(σ1j )j /∈I = 0 | (σ1j )j /∈I $← Zl−| I |
]
,
when σ˜′ is not constantly zero.
To find an upper bound on the error probability of the algorithm using Schwartz-Zippel
lemma,
Pr
[
σ˜′(σ1j )j /∈I = 0 | (σ1j )j /∈I $← Zl−| I |
]
≤ Pr
[
σ˜′(σ1j )j /∈I ≡ 0 mod p | (σ1j )j /∈I $← Zl−| I |p
]
≤ deg f
p
≤ d¯
2λ
= negl(λ)
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where d¯ is the upper bound on degrees of the admissible functions in our scheme, which is
polynomially bounded. Therefore, the error probability of the algorithm is negligible and we
can efficiently determine if σ˜ is constant or not with overwhelming probability.
Theorem 8. The scheme HMAJY is SUF-CMA.
Proof. We prove the theorem by a hybrid argument to transform the game SUF-CMA into
another game with a negligible advantage for any PPT adversary A. Let pp := (λ, β, F,Q) and
sk := (p, k) for any Q ∈ [2, 2λ−1) and F ′k : {0, 1}λ → Zp be defined as F ′k(τ) := Fk(τ) mod p
for any τ ∈ {0, 1}λ. We know that if β − λ = ω(λ), then F ′k : {0, 1}λ → Zp is also a PRF for
any p ∈ [2λ−1, 2λ). Define GAME0 as the game that is identical to SUF-CMA except that the
PRF F ′k : {0, 1}λ → Zp is replaced with a real random function G : {0, 1}λ → Zp. This make a
negligible difference of advantages since F ′k is a PRF. That is,∣∣∣AdvSUF-CMAA (λ,Q)−AdvGAME0A (λ,Q) ∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ)
Define GAME1 as the game that is identical to GAME0 except that all of the encryption
queries are answered by the following encryption simulation.
Encryption Simulation
For each authentication query (τ, x) of A, if τ is new, then choose a random
integer r in the set [0, 2
γ
Q ) and give σ := rQ+x to A as an answer for the query.
And then update H(τ) := (x, σ). Otherwise, that is, if τ is used, then reject
the query.
We have to show that the statistical distance bewteen the distributions of a ciphertext c0 in
GAME0 and a ciphertext c1 in GAME1, is negligible. The distribution of c1 is c1 = rQ + x,
where r
$← [0, d2γ/Qe) and the distribution of c0 is
c0 = rpQ+ a ; r
$← [0, d2γ/pQe)
= rpQ+ r′Q+ x ; r′ $← [0, p)
= (rp+ r′)Q+ x
= r′′Q+ x ; r′′ $← [0, p · d2γ/pQe).
So, ∆(c0, c1) ≤ pQ2γ ≤ 12γ−2λ and the distance is negligible if γ − 2λ = ω(log λ). Thus,∣∣∣AdvGAME0A (λ,Q)−AdvGAME1A (λ,Q) ∣∣∣ ≤ q(λ) · negl(λ),
where q is the number of encryption queries made by A, which is polynomially bounded. Note
that the above simulation of encryption does not use the secret prime p and we can postpone
the choice of p until it is needed.
Finally, define GAME2 as follows.
GAMEA(1
λ, Q):
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Initialization
Given a security parameter λ and Q, let γ := γ(λ) and β := β(λ). Initialize an
authentication history H as ⊥ and give pp := (λ, γ, β, F,Q) to A.
Queries
A can make authentication queries adaptively. For each authentication query
(τ, x) of A, if τ is new, then choose a random integer r in the set [0, 2
γ
Q ) and give
σ := rQ+ x to A as an answer for the query. And then update H(τ) := (x, σ).
Otherwise, that is, if τ is used, then reject the query.
Finalization
For the forgery attempt (f(τ1, · · · , τl), y, σˆ) of A, randomly choose (ci)i∈I in
the set [0, 2γ)|I| and compute σ˜ := Evalf(τ1,··· ,τl)|H(ci)i∈I . If σ˜ 6= σˆ and (σ˜ −
σˆ) mod p = 0 for a randomly chosen prime integer p ∈ [2λ−1, 2λ), then output
1. Otherwise, output 0.
The game GAME2 is identical to GAME1 except the finalization phase. The only difference
between two games GAME1 and GAME2, is the case that Evalf(τ1,··· ,τl)|H is not constant but
σ˜ = σˆ in the finalization phase.
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Chapter 5
Homomorphic authenticated
encryption
In this section, we define a primitive of a homomorphic authenticated encryption (HAE) and
its security. And we propose a concrete scheme that is somewhat homomorphic but fully secure
under the EF-AGCD assumption.
5.1 Definition
A HAE is a tuple Π = (Gen,Enc,Eval,Dec) of the following four PPT algorithms.
• (ek , sk) ← Gen(1λ): given a security parameter λ, Gen(1λ) outputs a public evaluation
key ek and a secret key sk .
• c ← Enc(sk , τ,m): given a secret key sk , a label τ ∈ L and a plaintext m ∈ M,
Enc(sk , τ,m) outputs a ciphertext c ∈ C.
• c˜ ← Eval(ek , f, c1, · · · , cl): given an evaluation key ek , an arity-l admissible function
f :Ml →M in F and l ciphertexts c1, · · · , cl ∈ C, Eval outputs a ciphertext c˜ ∈ C.
• m or ⊥ ← Dec(sk , (f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ): given a secret key sk , a labeled program (f, τ1, · · · , τl)
and a ciphertext cˆ ∈ C, Dec outputs a message m ∈M or ⊥.
We assume that evaluation key ek implicitly contains the information about a plaintext space
M, a ciphertext space C, a label space L, and an admissible function space F . And both Eval
and Dec are deterministic algorithms.
Compactness.
In order to exclude trivial constructions, we require that there exists some c > 0 such that, for
any λ ∈ Z+, the output size of Eval(ek , . . . ) and Enc(sk , ·, ·) are bounded by λc for any choice
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of their input, when (ek , sk)← Gen(1λ). That means that the ciphertext size is independent of
the choice of the admissible function f or the arity of f .
Correctness.
A HAE scheme must satisfy the following two correctness properties:
• We should have
m = Dec(sk , Iτ ,Enc(sk , τ,m)),
for any λ ∈ Z+, τ ∈ L and m ∈M, when (ek , sk)← Gen(1λ).
• We should have
f(m1, . . . ,ml) = Dec(sk , (f, τ1, . . . , τl), c),
for any λ ∈ Z+, any f ∈ F , any τi ∈ L, mi ∈M for i = 1, . . . , l, when (ek , sk)← Gen(1λ),
ci ← Enc(sk , τi,mi) for i = 1, . . . , l, and c← Eval(ek , f, c1, . . . , cl).
In addition, we require that a HAE should satisfy a property we call ciphertext constant
testability, which will be explained next.
Constant testability.
As done in an HMA, constant testability is defined as follows. Given an HAE Π, an admissible
function f :Ml →M of arity l, a subset I of the index set {1, · · · , l}, plaintexts (mi)i∈I ∈M|I|,
and their corresponding ciphertext (ci)i∈I ∈ C|I|, consider the following functions:
m˜f,(mi)i∈I := f(mi)i∈I
c˜f,(ci)i∈I := Eval(ek , f, (ci)i∈I).
More explicitly, m˜f,(mi)i∈I is a function from Ml−|I| to M defined by
m˜f,(mi)i∈I (mj)j 6∈I := f(m1, · · · ,ml),
for any (mj)j 6∈I ∈Ml−|I|. And c˜f,(ci)i∈I is a function from Cl−|I| to C defined by
c˜f,(ci)i∈I (cj)j 6∈I := Eval(ek , f, c1, · · · , cl),
That is, messages or ciphertexts for indices in I are fixed, and messages or ciphertexts for
indices in {1, . . . , l} \ I are considered as variables. In short, m˜ = m˜f,(mi)i∈I and c˜ = c˜f,(σi)i∈I
are partially evaluated functions. In particular, m˜f,(mi)i∈I and c˜f,(ci)i∈I are constant functions if
I = {1, . . . , l}.
We may need to determine whether such a function m˜ = m˜f,(mi)i∈I or c˜f,(ci)i∈I is constant or
not. So we define a property called ‘constant testability’ as follows. Depending whether we are
working on messages or ciphertexts, we define two versions of constant testability accordingly.
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Definition 7. We say that a HAE scheme Π satisfies the plaintext constant testability (PCT)
if there exists a PPT algorithm that determines if the function m˜ = m˜f,(mi)i∈I is constant or
not with overwhelming probability, for any evaluation key ek generated by Π.Gen, any admissible
function f :Ml →M of arity l, any subset I of the index set {1, · · · , l} and any (mi)i∈I ∈M|I|.
Definition 8. We say that a HAE scheme Π satisfies the ciphertext constant testability (CCT)
if there exists a PPT algorithm that determines if the function c˜f,(ci)i∈I is constant or not with
overwhelming probability, for any evaluation key ek generated by Π.Gen, any admissible function
f :Ml →M of arity l, any subset I of the index set {1, · · · , l} and any (ci)i∈I ∈ C|I|.
When the set of admissible functions supported by a HAE is simple, both PCT and CCT may
be satisfied. But, the plaintext constant testability might be a difficult property to be satisfied
in general; for example, if a HAE supports general boolean circuits, then PCT implies that
the CIRCUIT-SAT problem can be solved in polynomial time with overwhelming probability,
therefore the polynomial hierarchy PH collapses.
On the other hand, we claim that a HAE to satisfy the ciphertext constant testability is a
relatively mild requirement: unlike the plaintext spaceM, often the ciphertext space C might be
a large ring, and c˜f,(ci)i∈I is a polynomial on the ring C, in which case we may use the Schwartz-
Zippel lemma to perform the polynomial identity testing. This applies to our HAE scheme to
be presented in this thesis, as shown in Theorem 16.
Moreover, we show that if Π is a HAE which does not necessarily satisfy CCT, then there is
a simple generic transformation which turns it into another HAE Π′ which satisfies CCT, while
preserving original security properties satisfied by Π. This will be shown in Theorems 13, 14
and 15. Without loss of generality, we assume the CCT property to be an additional requirement
for a HAE to satisfy.
5.2 Security Notions
The security goals of an HAE scheme is both privacy and authenticity as same as an authen-
ticated encryption. To define a security game for an HAE scheme, we consider two possible
attack models; one is the chosen-plaintext attack(CPA) and the other is the chosen-ciphertext
attack(CCA). In the CPA, we allow that an adversary adaptively makes encryption queries. In
the CCA, we allow that an adversary adaptively makes not only encryption queries but also
decryption queries. There is one trivial restriction on encryption queries; a label used to gener-
ate a ciphertext for some plaintext can not be used again to generate a ciphertext for another
plaintext. In other words, for each label τ ∈ L, either τ is used, that is, there exists a unique
plaintext m ∈ M such that exactly one ciphertext c ∈ C has generated by the encryption algo-
rithm Enc(sk , τ,m), or not used. To prevent a used label from being reused in the encryption
algorithm Enc, we can maintain a history of encryption queries as follows.
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Encryption History An encryption history H : L → {⊥} ∪ (M×T ) is a function, which is
dynamically changed as encryption queries made by an adversary.
• At first, H is initialized as constantly ⊥. That is, H(τ) = ⊥ for all τ ∈ L.
• For each encryption query (τ,m) ∈ L×M, if τ is new, that is, H(τ) = ⊥, then the query
is accepted and we update H(τ) := (m, c), where c ← Enc(sk , τ,m). Otherwise, if τ is
used, that is, H(τ) 6= ⊥, then the query is rejected.
In the following, we assume that an adversary does not make an encryption query for a used
label.
Privacy
Here we define two security notions, IND-CPA and IND-CCA for privacy of HAE. Our definition
of IND-CPA for HAE is a homomorphic version of the IND-CPA security. We use the following
security game IND-CPAΠ,A between the challenger and the adversary A, which is a natural
adaptation of the corresponding security game of the symmetric-key encryption.
Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attack (IND-CPA)
IND-CPAΠ,A(1
λ):
Initialization. A key pair (ek , sk)← Gen(1λ) is generated. Then ek is given to A.
Queries. A may make encryption queries adaptively. For each encryption query
(τ,m) of A, the challenger returns an answer c← Enc(sk , τ,m) to A.
Challenge. A outputs the challenge (τ∗,m∗0,m∗1). The challenger flips a coin b
$←
{0, 1}, gives the corresponding challenge ciphertext c∗ ← Enc(sk , τ∗,m∗b) to A.
Queries. Again A may make encryption queries adaptively, and such queries are
answered precisely as before.
Finalization. A outputs a bit b′, and then the challenger returns 1 if b = b′, and 0
otherwise.
The advantage of A in the game IND-CPA for the scheme Π is defined as
AdvIND-CPAΠ,A (λ) :=
∣∣∣∣Pr [IND-CPAΠ,A(1λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
We say that a HAE Π satisfies IND-CPA, if the advantage AdvIND-CPAΠ,A (λ) is negligible for any
PPT adversary A.
We also consider a homomorphic version of the IND-CCA security of secret-key encryption.
Even though the usual IND-CCA security is not achievable for homomorphic encryption due
to the malleability, nevertheless we may define a version of IND-CCA for HAE. It is because
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that for HAE, decryption of a ciphertext is done with respect to a labeled program. So, while
the ciphertext is still malleable by function evaluation, a decryption query should essentially
declare how the ciphertext was produced. This allows a homomorphic version of IND-CCA to
be defined naturally as follows.
Homomorphic IND-CCA for a HAE Π = (Gen,Enc,Eval,Dec) is defined using the following
security game IND-CCAΠ,A, which is also a natural extension of the security game IND-CCA
of a secret-key encryption.
This time, the important difference is on the definition of legality of a decryption query
after the Challenge phase. In the IND-CCA game for the symmetric encryption, the only illegal
decryption query after Challenge phase is the decryption query for the challenge ciphertext itself.
On the other hand, in the HAE case, any decryption query for a ciphertext that was produced by
function evaluation which may nontrivially depend on the input m∗0 or m∗1 should be considered
illegal, since decryption of that ciphertext could reveal the bit b. This is formalized as follows.
To check the legality of a decryption query after Challenge, the security game keeps the
encryption history S. Then, we say that a decryption query ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ) after Challenge
phase is illegal, if τ∗ = τi∗ for some i∗ ∈ I, and the two functions f˜0 and f˜1 are not equal, where
I := {i ∈ {1, · · · , l} | (τi,mi, c) ∈ S for some mi ∈M, c ∈ C} ,
f˜0 := f(mi)i∈I ,with mi∗ = m∗0,
f˜1 := f(mi)i∈I ,with mi∗ = m∗1.
This means that the function value of f depends nontrivially whether m∗0 or m∗1 is used as the
i∗th plaintext input. In the following security game, it is forbidden for the adversary A to make
any illegal decryption query after the Challenge phase.
Indistinguishability under Chosen Ciphertext Attack (IND-CCA)
IND-CCAΠ,A(1
λ):
Initialization. A key pair (ek , sk)← Gen(1λ) is generated. Then ek is given to the
adversary A.
Queries. A may make encryption queries and decryption queries adaptively. For
each encryption query (τ,m) ofA, the challenger returns an answer Enc(sk , τ,m)
to A. For each decryption query ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), c) of A, the challenger returns
an answer Dec(sk , (f, τ1, · · · , τl), c).
Challenge. A outputs the challenge tuple (τ∗,m∗0,m∗1). The challenger flips a coin
b
$← {0, 1}, gives the corresponding challenge ciphertext c∗ ← Enc(sk , τ∗,m∗b)
to A.
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Queries After Challenge. Again, A may make encryption queries and decryption
queries adaptively. This time, it is forbidden for A to make illegal decryption
queries. Then, any encryption or decryption query of A is answered precisely
as before.
Finalization. A outputs a bit b′, and then the challenger returns 1 if b = b′, and 0
otherwise.
The advantage of A in the game IND-CCA for the scheme Π is defined as
AdvIND-CCAΠ,A (λ) :=
∣∣∣∣Pr [IND-CCAΠ,A(1λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
We say that a HAE Π satisfies IND-CCA, if the advantage AdvIND-CCAΠ,A (λ) is negligible for any
PPT adversary A which does not make illegal decryption queries.
Authenticity
The goal of an adversary in a security game for authenticity is to make a forgery. We define a
forgery as follows.
Forgery Let ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ) be a forgery attempt given by an adversary. It is a forgery if
and only if ⊥ 6= Dec(sk , (f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ) and satisfies one of the following two conditions.
• m˜f,(mi)i∈I is not constant; a forgery of type 1.
• m˜f,(mi)i∈I is constantly m˜ but m˜ 6= Dec(sk , (f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ); a forgery of type 2.
where I is the set of indices of used labels in τ1, · · · , τl.
Also, we define a strong forgery to obtain a notion of a stronger security,
Strong Forgery Let ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ) be a forgery attempt given by an adversary. It is a
strong forgery if and only if ⊥ 6= Dec(sk , (f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ) and satisfies one of the following two
conditions.
• Either m˜f,(mi)i∈I or c˜f,(ci)i∈I is not constant; a strong forgery of type 1.
• m˜f,(mi)i∈I is constantly m˜ and c˜f,(ci)i∈I is constantly c˜ but (m˜, c˜) 6= (mˆ, cˆ); a strong forgery
of type 2.
where I is the set of indices of used labels in τ1, · · · , τl.
Now, we can define four security notions, UF-CPA, SUF-CCA, UF-CPA and SUF-CCA for
authenticity of HAE.
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Unforgeability under Chosen Plaintext Attack (UF-CPA)
UF-CPAA(1
λ):
Initialization
Given a security parameter λ, generate a pair (pp, sk)← Gen(1λ). Give pp to
A.
Queries
A can make encryption queries adaptively. For each encryption query (τ,m) of
A, give Enc(sk , τ,m) to A as an answer for the query.
Finalization
For the forgery attempt ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ) of A, if it is indeed a forgery, then
output 1. Otherwise, output 0.
The advantage of A in the game UF-CPA is defined as
AdvUF-CPAA (1
λ) := Pr
[
UF-CPAA(1
λ) = 1
]
We say that an HAE satisfies UF-CPA, if AdvUF-CPAA (1
λ) is negligible for any PPT adversary
A.
Strong Unforgeability under Chosen Plaintext Attack (SUF-CPA)
SUF-CPAA(1
λ):
Initialization
Given a security parameter λ, generate a pair (pp, sk)← Gen(1λ). Give pp to
A.
Queries
A can make encryption queries adaptively. For each encryption query (τ,m) of
A, give Enc(sk , τ,m) to A as an answer for the query.
Finalization
For the forgery attempt ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ) of A, if it is indeed a strong forgery,
then output 1. Otherwise, output 0.
The advantage of A in the game SUF-CPA is defined as
AdvSUF-CPAA (1
λ) := Pr
[
SUF-CPAA(1
λ) = 1
]
We say that an HAE satisfies SUF-CPA, if AdvSUF-CPAA (1
λ) is negligible for any PPT adversary
A.
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Unforgeability under Chosen Ciphertext Attack (UF-CCA)
UF-CCAA(1
λ):
Initialization
Given a security parameter λ, generate a pair (pp, sk)← Gen(1λ). Give pp to
A.
Queries
A can make encryption queries and decryption queries adaptively. For each
encryption query (τ,m) of A, give Enc(sk , τ,m) to A as an answer for the query.
For each decryption query ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), c) of A, give Dec(sk , (f, τ1, · · · , τl), c)
to A as an answer for the query.
Finalization
For the forgery attempt ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ) of A, if it is indeed a forgery, then
output 1. Otherwise, output 0.
The advantage of A in the game UF-CCA is defined as
AdvUF-CCAA (1
λ) := Pr
[
UF-CCAA(1
λ) = 1
]
We say that an HAE satisfies UF-CCA, if AdvUF-CCAA (1
λ) is negligible for any PPT adversary
A.
Strong Unforgeability under Chosen Ciphertext Attack (SUF-CCA)
SUF-CCAA(1
λ):
Initialization
Given a security parameter λ, generate a pair (pp, sk)← Gen(1λ). Give pp to
A.
Queries
A can make encryption queries and decryption queries adaptively. For each
encryption query (τ,m) of A, give Enc(sk , τ,m) to A as an answer for the query.
For each decryption query ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), c) of A, give Dec(sk , (f, τ1, · · · , τl), c)
to A as an answer for the query.
Finalization
For the forgery attempt ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ) of A, if it is indeed a strong forgery,
then output 1. Otherwise, output 0.
The advantage of A in the game SUF-CCA is defined as
AdvSUF-CCAA (1
λ) := Pr
[
SUF-CCAA(1
λ) = 1
]
We say that an HAE satisfies SUF-CCA, if AdvSUF-CCAA (1
λ) is negligible for any PPT adversary
A.
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5.3 Relations on security notions
In this section, we investigate relations between the six security notions defined in the previous
section. First, we have trivial implications from CCA security to CPA security.
Theorem 9. UF-CCA implies UF-CPA, SUF-CCA implies SUF-CPA, and IND-CCA implies
IND-CPA.
Proof. Trivial.
The following theorem says that the strong unforgeability implies unforgeability.
Theorem 10. SUF-CCA implies UF-CCA. And SUF-CPA implies UF-CPA.
Proof. It is enough to show that a forgery is also a strong forgery. Let ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ) be
a forgery. If it is a forgery of type 1, then f˜ = f(mi)i∈I is not constant. That is, there
exist two tuples (m1j )j 6∈I and (m
2
j )j 6∈I such that f˜(m
1
j )j 6∈I 6= f˜(m2j )j 6∈I . Then there exists two
distinct tuples (c1j )j 6∈I and (c
2
j )j 6∈I such that m
1
j = Dec(sk , Iτj , c
1
j ) and m
2
j = Dec(sk , Iτj , c
2
j ) for
each j 6∈ I. Then we have c˜(c1j )j 6∈I 6= c˜(c2j )j 6∈I by the correctness property, which shows that
c˜ = Eval(ek , f, (ci)i∈I) is nonconstant. So it is a strong forgery of type 1.
If it is a forgery of type 2 but not a strong forgery of type 1, then both f˜ and c˜ are constants
and f˜ 6= Dec(sk , (f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ). But f˜ = Dec(sk , (f, τ1, · · · , τl), c˜), again by the correctness.
This means that cˆ 6= c˜, and this shows that it is a strong forgery of type 2.
Bellare et al. [1] showed that, in case of a MAC, strong unforgeability implies strong un-
forgeability even when the adversary has access to the verification oracle, and in case of an AE,
integrity of ciphertexts implies integrity of ciphertexts even when the adversary has access to the
verification oracle. The following can be considered as a homomorphic analogue to the result.
Theorem 11. SUF-CPA implies SUF-CCA.
Proof. We prove the theorem by a hybrid argument to transform the game SUF-CCA into
another game that is essentially the same as the game SUF-CPA.
Let A be any PPT adversary. Without loss of generality, we may assume that A makes
exactly q = q(λ) decryption queries.
For each i ∈ {0, . . . , q}, define SUF-CCAi to be the game that is identical to SUF-CCA
except that the first i decryption queries are answered by the following decryption simulation.
Decryption Simulation. For a decryption query ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ) made by the
adversary A, let I ← ∅ and do the following for i = 1, · · · , l: If (τi,m, c) ∈ S
for some m ∈ M and c ∈ C, then I ← I ∪ {i} and mi = m, ci = c. And then
let c˜ = Eval(ek , f, (ci)i∈I) and f˜ = f(mi)i∈I . If c˜ is constant and c˜ = cˆ, then
return f˜ . Otherwise, return ⊥.
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In particular, SUF-CCA is equal to SUF-CCA0. So,
AdvSUF-CCA
0
Π,A (λ) = Adv
SUF-CCA
Π,A (λ).
Moreover, since the decryption simulation does not use any secret information and is efficiently
computable by the CCT property in SUF-CCAq, the adversary A does not obtain any useful
information by the decryption queries at all in this game. Formally, we can easily construct an
adversary A′ which plays SUF-CPA game and makes the same number of encryption queries as
A does, and satisfying
AdvSUF-CCA
q
Π,A (λ) = Adv
SUF-CPA
Π,A′ (λ).
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , q}, the difference between AdvSUF-CCAi−1Π,A (λ) and AdvSUF-CCA
i
Π,A (λ) is
bounded by the probability that the decryption simulation on the ith decryption query made
by A fails (that is, is different from the real decryption). From the definition of a strong forgery,
it is easy to check that the decryption simulation fails if and only if the decryption query made
by A is a strong forgery: we have
decryption simulation fails
⇐⇒ c˜ is constant and c˜ = cˆ, but ⊥ = Dec(sk , (f, τ1, . . . , τl), cˆ), or,
c˜ is nonconstant, or c˜ is constant but c˜ 6= cˆ, but ⊥ 6= Dec(sk , (f, τ1, . . . , τl), cˆ),
but when c˜ is constant and c˜ = cˆ, by the correctness we should have Dec(sk , (f, τ1, . . . , τl), cˆ) = f˜ ,
which should also be a constant not equal to ⊥, therefore this subcase cannot happen. So,
decryption simulation fails
⇐⇒ c˜ is nonconstant, or c˜ is constant but c˜ 6= cˆ, but ⊥ 6= Dec(sk , (f, τ1, . . . , τl), cˆ)
⇐⇒ ((f, τ1, . . . , τl), cˆ) is a strong forgery.
Hence, we may construct a PPT adversary A′′ for the game SUF-CPA using the ith decryp-
tion query made by A. Specifically, A′′ runs the adversary A until it makes the ith decryption
query, while answering the encryption queries using its own encryption queries and answering
the previous decryption queries by the decryption simulation. Then A′′ aborts the running of
A, and outputs the ith decryption query of A as its own forgery attempt.
So, ∣∣∣AdvSUF-CCAi−1Π,A (λ)−AdvSUF-CCAiΠ,A (λ) ∣∣∣ ≤ AdvSUF-CPAΠ,A′′ (λ) = negl(λ).
Therefore,
AdvSUF-CCAΠ,A (λ) ≤ AdvSUF-CPAΠ,A′ (λ) +
∣∣AdvSUF-CCAΠ,A (λ)−AdvSUF-CPAΠ,A′ (λ) ∣∣
= negl(λ) +
∣∣∣AdvSUF-CCA0Π,A (λ)−AdvSUF-CCAqΠ,A (λ) ∣∣∣
≤ negl(λ) +
q∑
i=1
∣∣∣AdvSUF-CCAiΠ,A (λ)−AdvSUF-CCAi−1Π,A (λ) ∣∣∣
≤ negl(λ) + q · negl(λ)
= negl(λ).
39
So AdvSUF-CCAΠ,A (λ) is also negiligible for any PPT adversary A and therefore Π is SUF-CCA.
Theorem 12. IND-CPA and SUF-CPA together imply IND-CCA.
Proof. Proof of this theorem is similar to that of Theorem 11; again we prove this theorem by
a hybrid argument to transform the game IND-CCA into another game that is essentially same
as the game IND-CPA.
Let A be a PPT adversary engaging in the game IND-CCA. Again, without loss of generality,
we assume that A makes exactly qb = qb(λ) decryption queries before the Challenge phase, and
qa = qa(λ) decryption queries after the Challenge phase.
For each i ∈ {0, . . . , qb}, define IND-CCAb,i to be the game that is equal to IND-CCA
except that the first i decryption queries before the Challenge phase are answered by the same
decryption simulation as shown in Theorem 11.
For each i ∈ {0, . . . , qa}, define IND-CCAa,i to be the game that is equal to IND-CCA except
that all decryption queries before the Challenge phase, and the first i decryption queries after
the Challenge phase are answered by the same decryption simulation.
By definition, IND-CCAb,0 = IND-CCA and IND-CCAb,qb = IND-CCAa,0. So,
AdvIND-CCA
b,0
Π,A (λ) = Adv
IND-CCA
Π,A (λ),
AdvIND-CCA
b,qb
Π,A (λ) = Adv
IND-CCAa,0
Π,A (λ).
Now, we construct a PPT adversary A′ for the security game IND-CPA using the adversary
A. The adversary A′ simulates the game IND-CCAa,qa for the adversary A as follows:
The adversary A′(1λ):
Initialization. The evaluation key ek is generated and given to A′. Then A′ ini-
tializes S ← ∅, and gives ek to the adversary A.
Queries. When A makes an encryption query (τ,m), if (τ, ·, ·) 6∈ S then A′ makes
the same encryption query, receives the ciphertext c ← Enc(sk , τ,m), replies
A with the answer c, and updates S by S ← S ∪ {(τ,m, c)}. Otherwise, the
encryption query is rejected.
When A makes a decryption query ((f, τ0, · · · , τl), cˆ), it is answered by the
decryption simulation as in Theorem 11.
Challenge. A outputs the challenge tuple (τ∗,m∗0,m∗1). If (τ∗, ·, ·) 6∈ S, then A′
outputs the same challenge tuple, and receives the challenge ciphertext c∗ ←
Enc(sk , τ∗,m∗b). A
′ gives the challenge ciphertext c∗ to A, and updates S by
S ← S ∪ {(τ∗,m∗0, c∗)}. Otherwise, the challenge is rejected.
Queries After Challenge. Any encryption query, or any decryption query of A is
answered precisely as before.
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Finalization. When A outputs a bit b′, the adversary A′ outputs the same bit b′.
In the first Queries phase, the simulation of A′ for the game IND-CCAa,qa is perfect. But,
in the Challenge phase, the history S is updated by S ← S ∪ {(τ∗,m∗0, c∗)} because A′ does not
know the coin b, while in the actual game IND-CCAa,qa , S is updated by S ← S∪{(τ∗,m∗b , c∗)}.
We need to show that, despite this the simulation of A′ for the game IND-CCAa,qa in the ‘Queries
After Challenge’ phase is correct.
We see that the decryption simulation might potentially be incorrect only when b = 1 and
τ∗ ∈ I. So, suppose that a decryption query of A is ((f, τ0, · · · , τl), cˆ) when b = 1 and τ∗ ∈ I.
Let τ∗ = τi∗ for some i∗ ∈ {1, . . . , l}. Let us compare how this query is answered in the game
IND-CCAa,qa and in the simulation of A′.
In the game IND-CCAa,qa , m∗1 is encrypted under the label τ∗ to produce the ciphertext c∗.
So, in the game IND-CCAa,qa , c˜ = Eval(ek , f, (ci)i∈I) and f˜ = f(mi)i∈I are computed, and the
decryption query is answered with f˜ if and only if c˜ is constantly equal to cˆ ∈ C. And in the
computation of f˜ , m∗1 is used for the i∗th plaintext input. To emphasize this fact, let us denote
this f˜ as f˜1, meaning that m
∗
1 was used to produce this plaintext.
In the simulation of A′, still m∗1 is encrypted under the label τ∗ to produce the ciphertext
c∗, and c˜ = Eval(ek , f, (ci)i∈I) and f˜ = f(mi)i∈I are computed, and the decryption query is
answered with f˜ if and only if c˜ is constantly equal to cˆ ∈ C. But, this f˜ is computed using m∗0
as the i∗th plaintext input. So let us denote this f˜ as f˜0.
Therefore, in both scenarios, the decryption query is answered by ⊥ if and only if c˜ is
nonconstant, or c˜ is constant but not equal to cˆ. Meanwhile, when c˜ is constantly equal to cˆ,
then the game IND-CCAa,qa will output f˜1, but the simulation of A
′ will output f˜0. Despite
this, recall that any decryption query made by A after the Challenge phase is legal by the
definition of IND-CCA. Hence, we have f˜0 = f˜1. This shows that A
′ correctly simulates the
game IND-CCAa,qa , and we conclude that
AdvIND-CCA
a,qa
Π,A (λ) = Adv
IND-CPA
Π,A′ (λ).
Now consider the difference of each consecutive two games. Again, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , qb},
the difference between AdvIND-CCA
b,i−1
Π,A (λ) and Adv
SUF-CCAb,i
Π,A (λ) is not greater than the prob-
ability that the decryption simulation on the ith decryption query made by A before Challenge
fails, and we may use this to construct an adversary A′′ for the game SUF-CPA just like in
Theorem 11. Note that A′′ aborts the running of A before it has any chance to output the
challenge tuple.
So, ∣∣∣AdvIND-CCAb,i−1Π,A (λ)−AdvIND-CCAb,iΠ,A (λ) ∣∣∣ ≤ AdvSUF-CPAΠ,A′′ (λ) = negl(λ).
Similarly, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , qa}, the difference between AdvIND-CCAa,i−1Π,A (λ) and AdvSUF-CCA
a,i
Π,A (λ)
is not greater than the probability that the decryption simulation on the ith decryption query
made by A after Challenge fails, and we may use this to construct an adversary A′′ for the
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game SUF-CPA just like in Theorem 11. In this case, the challenge tuple output of A is
handled by A′′; A′′ flips the coin b $← {0, 1}, and obtains the challenge ciphertext via its encryp-
tion query (τ∗,m∗b). Since A
′′ knows the coin b, the correct encryption history is maintained:
(τ∗,m∗b , c
∗) ∈ S.
So, ∣∣∣AdvIND-CCAa,i−1Π,A (λ)−AdvIND-CCAa,iΠ,A (λ) ∣∣∣ ≤ AdvSUF-CPAΠ,A′′ (λ) = negl(λ).
Hence,
AdvIND-CCAΠ,A (λ) ≤ AdvIND-CPAΠ,A′ (λ) +
∣∣AdvIND-CCAΠ,A (λ)−AdvIND-CPAΠ,A′ (λ) ∣∣
= negl(λ) +
∣∣∣AdvIND-CCAb,0Π,A (λ)−AdvIND-CCAa,qaΠ,A (λ) ∣∣∣
≤ negl(λ) +
qb∑
i=1
∣∣∣AdvIND-CCAb,iΠ,A (λ)−AdvIND-CCAb,i−1Π,A (λ) ∣∣∣
+
qa∑
i=1
∣∣∣AdvIND-CCAa,iΠ,A (λ)−AdvIND-CCAa,i−1Π,A (λ) ∣∣∣
≤ negl(λ) + (qb + qa) · negl(λ) = negl(λ).
So, AdvIND-CCAΠ,A (λ) is also negiligible for any PPT adversary A. Therefore Π is IND-CCA.
In conclusion, we see that IND-CPA and SUF-CPA together imply the strongest security
notions, IND-CCA and SUF-CCA. When we discuss our construction in Section 5.5, we show
that our scheme is IND-CPA and SUF-CPA.
5.4 Generic transformation to CCT
Suppose that Π is a HAE which is not necessarily ciphertext constant testable. We describe
a generic construction that transforms a HAE Π into another HAE Π′ satisfying CCT while
preserving IND-CPA or SUF-CPA of the original scheme Π. Our construction is based on the
Merkle hash tree technique used by Gennaro and Wichs [14]. For concreteness, here we assume
that Π represents admissible functions as circuits. In such a case, we also assume that Eval
algorithm works by evaluating ciphertexts gate by gate; the evaluation of a circuit becomes a
circuit of ciphertexts.
Now, using a pseudorandom function F and a family H of collision-resistant hash functions,
we can transform a HAE Π to another HAE Π′ as follows.
Scheme Π′ = (Gen′,Enc′,Eval′,Dec′):
• (ek ′, sk ′) ← Gen′(1λ): Generate keys (ek , sk) ← Gen(1λ), k ← {0, 1}λ and
H ← H. Return ek ′ = (ek , H) and sk ′ = (sk , k).
• c′ ← Enc′(sk ′, τ,m): Let h = H(Fk(τ)) and c← Enc(sk , τ,m). Return (h, c).
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• c˜′ ← Eval′(ek ′, f, c′1, · · · , c′l): Let f : Ml → M be a circuit. For each i =
1, · · · , l, parse c′i = (hi, ci). Let h˜ = fH(h1, · · · , hl) and c˜← Eval(ek , f, c1, · · · , cl).
Return (h˜, c˜).
• m ← Dec′(sk ′, (f, τ1, · · · , τl), c˜′): Let f : Ml → M be a circuit. Parse c˜′ =
(h˜, c˜). For each i = 1, · · · , l, let hi = H(Fk(τi)). If h˜ = fH(h1, · · · , hl), then
return Dec(sk , (f, τ1, · · · , τl), c˜). Otherwise, return ⊥.
Above, we assume that Fk : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}λ and H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ.
Π′ and Π share the same message space M and the label space L. The ciphertext space of
Π′ is {0, 1}λ × C, where C is the ciphertext space of Π.
And the correctness of Π′ can easily be concluded from that of Π. Below, we show that the
constructed scheme Π′ satisfies the CCT property, and also this generic transformation preserves
both SUF-CPA and IND-CPA.
Theorem 13. The HAE scheme Π′ satisfies CCT.
Proof. As in p. 31, let f : Ml → M be an arity-l admissible function, I a subset of the index
set {1, . . . , l}, and (mi)i∈I ∈ M|I| and (c′i = (hi, ci))i∈I ∈ ({0, 1}λ × C)|I| some plaintexts and
their corresponding ciphertexts.
Consider c˜′ : ({0, 1}λ × C)l−|I| → {0, 1}λ × C defined as
c˜′ := Eval(ek ′, f, (c′i)i∈I) = (f
H(hi)i∈I ,Eval(ek , f, (ci)i∈I)).
The above expression c˜′ is a function of the values for the ‘missing’ indices: (hi)i 6∈I and (ci)i 6∈I .
If I = {1, . . . , l}, then c˜′ is clearly constant. Now, suppose that I 6= {1, . . . , l}. Consider
the case when the ith input of f is unused for all indices i 6∈ I. In that case, again clearly c˜′ is
constant.
Finally, consider the case that the ith input of f is actually used for at least one index i 6∈ I.
Since the underlying hash function H is collision-resistant, the hash tree fH(h1, . . . , hl) cannot
be constant on the variable hi except with negligible probability. So, c˜
′ is not constant except
with negligible probability. This means that we can trivially determine if c˜′ is constant or not.
Therefore, Π′ satisfies CCT.
Theorem 14. If Π is IND-CPA, then Π′ is also IND-CPA.
Proof. We will just provide a sketch of the proof. Let A′ be any PPT adversary for the game
IND-CPAΠ′,A′ . We construct a PPT adversary A for the game IND-CPAΠ,A that simulates the
game IND-CPAΠ′,A′ for the adversary A
′.
Most of the simulation is trivial message-passing, but for the challenge (τ∗,m∗0,m∗1) made by
A′, A returns the challenge ciphertext (H(r), c∗) to A′, where r $← {0, 1}λ and c∗ is the challenge
ciphertext given to A in the security game IND-CPAΠ,A.
This simulation does work because τ∗ is a new label and F is a PRF. Moreover, H(r) in the
challenge ciphertext given to A′ does not contain any information that may help A′ to distinguish
43
between m∗0 and m∗1. So the advantage of A′ entirely comes from c∗. Therefore, the difference
of advantages of A and A′ is negligible. Formally, we have
AdvIND-CPAΠ′,A′ (λ) ≤ AdvIND-CPAΠ,A (λ) + AdvPRFF,A′′(λ).
Theorem 15. If Π is SUF-CPA, then Π′ is also SUF-CPA.
Proof. Let A′ be a PPT adversary engaged in the security game SUF-CPAΠ′,A′ . Using A′, we
construct a PPT adversary A for the security game SUF-CPAΠ,A which simulates the game
SUF-CPAΠ′,A′ for the adversary A
′.
Adversary A(1λ):
Initialization. A set S is initialized to be the empty set ∅. Receiving the evaluation
key ek , the adversary A picks H ← H, k ← {0, 1}λ, and gives the evaluation
key ek ′ := (ek , H) to A′, and keeps the PRF key k by himself.
Queries. Whenever A′ makes an encryption query (τ,m), if (τ, ·, ·) /∈ S, then A
makes the same encryption query. Receiving the answer c← Enc(sk , τ,m), the
adversary A computes h := H(Fk(τ)), answers the encryption query of A
′ by
c′ := (h, c), and updates S by S ← S ∪ {(τ,m, c′)}. Otherwise, the query is
rejected.
Forgery. A′ outputs a forgery attempt ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ′). Parse cˆ′ = (hˆ, cˆ). Then
the adversary A outputs ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ).
Now, let us show that if the forgery attempt ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ′ = (hˆ, cˆ)) of A′ is a strong
forgery for SUF-CPAΠ′,A′ , then ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ) is also a strong forgery for SUF-CPAΠ,A, except
with negligible probability. Let I be the set of indices i ∈ {1, . . . , l} such that (τi,mi, ci) ∈ S.
Since ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ′) is valid in Π′, ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ) is also valid in Π. Also, we have
fH(H(Fk(τ1)), · · · , H(Fk(τl))) = hˆ.
Suppose I 6= {1, . . . , l}, and assume there exists at least an index j 6∈ I which is used in the
circuit f . In this case, we claim that fH(H(Fk(τ1)), · · · , H(Fk(τl))) = hˆ only with negligible
probability. Since j is new, Fk(τj) is computationally indistinguishable to a random number
rj
$← {0, 1}λ. Due to the collision resistance of H, the probability
Pr
[
fH(H(Fk(τ1)), · · · , rj , · · · , H(Fk(τl))) = hˆ
∣∣∣ rj $← {0, 1}λ]
should be negligible. So, fH(H(Fk(τ1)), · · · , H(Fk(τl))) = hˆ holds only with negligible probabil-
ity. Therefore, since we already have fH(H(Fk(τ1)), · · · , H(Fk(τl))) = hˆ, we may assume with
negligible exception that any i 6∈ I is unused in the circuit f . In this case, both c˜′ and c˜ are
constants, where
c˜′ = (h˜, c˜),
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with
h˜ := fH((H(Fk(τi)))i∈I), c˜ = Eval(ek , f, (ci)i∈I).
But then ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ′) must be a strong forgery of type 2. So we have
cˆ′ = (hˆ, cˆ) 6= (hˆ, c˜) = c˜′.
Therefore, cˆ 6= c˜, and ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ) is a strong forgery of type 2 for Π. This shows that
AdvSUF-CPAΠ′,A′ (λ) ≤ AdvSUF-CPAΠ,A (λ) = negl(λ).
Hence Π′ is SUF-CPA.
5.5 Construction
In this section, we describe our HAE scheme Π given in [20] and show that it satisfies correctness
and CCT. All of the parameters ρ, η, γ, d¯ of the scheme are polynomials in λ. The specific choices
of these parameters are given after the description of the scheme.
We use a pseudorandom function F in our construction. We assume that Fk : {0, 1}λ → Zq0
for each k ∈ {0, 1}λ. The message space and the ciphertext space of our scheme is ZQ and Zy0 ,
respectively, and the label space is {0, 1}λ. To represent admissible functions we use arithmetic
circuits, that is, circuits consisting of + gates and × gates. Such a circuit f of arity l determines
a polynomial f : Zl → Z with integral coefficients. We use such a circuit to compute function
values of plaintext inputs in ZQ, and also to homomorphically evaluate ciphertexts in Zy0 . The
precise description of the admissible function space will be given in the next, together with
discussions on the correctness property.
SCHEME. Π = (Gen,Enc,Eval,Dec)
• (ek , sk) ← Gen(1λ, Q): Given security parameter λ and any modulus Q ∈
[2, 2λ], choose p
$← [2η−1, 2η) ∩ PRIME and q0 $← [0, 2γp ) ∩ ROUGH(2λ). Let
y0 = pq0. Choose a PRF key k ← {0, 1}λ. Return (ek , sk), where ek = (Q, y0),
and sk = (p, q0, Q, k).
• c← Enc(sk , τ,m): Given the secret key sk , a label τ ∈ {0, 1}λ and a plaintext
m ∈ ZQ, choose r $← (−2ρ, 2ρ). Let a = rQ + m and b = Fk(τ). Return
c = CRT(p,q0)(a, b).
• c˜← Eval(ek , f, c1, · · · , cl): Given the evaluation key ek , an arithmetic circuit f
of arity l and ciphertexts c1, · · · , cl, return f(c1, · · · , cl) mod y0
• m ← Dec(sk , (f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ): For i = 1 to l, compute bi ← Fk(τi) and
b = f(b1, · · · , bl) mod q0. Return m = (cˆ mod p) mod Q, if b = cˆ mod q0. Oth-
erwise, return ⊥.
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Correctness
To show the correctness of the scheme, let (ek , sk)← Gen(1λ, Q) for any λ ∈ Z+ and any mod-
ulus Q ∈ [2, 2λ]. Let ci ← Enc(sk , τi,mi) for each i = 1, · · · , l. And c˜ ← Eval(ek , f, c1, · · · , cl)
For any arithmetic circuit f of arity l. We identify an arithmetic circuit f of arity l with the
l-variate integral polynomial determined by f . Let d := deg(f), Then
c˜ mod p = (f(c1, · · · , cl) mod y0) mod p
= f(c1, · · · , cl) mod p
= f(c1 mod p, · · · , cl mod p) mod p
= f(r1Q+m1, · · · , rlQ+ml) mod p
= f(r1Q+m1, · · · , rlQ+ml)
The last equality in the above equations holds if
| f(r1Q+m1, · · · , rlQ+ml) | ≤ p
2
.
And so, in this case,
(c˜ mod p) mod Q = f(r1Q+m1, · · · , rlQ+ml) mod Q
= f(m1, · · · ,ml) mod Q
Since | f(r1Q+m1, · · · , rlQ+ml) | ≤ ‖f‖1 · 2d(ρ+λ) and 2η−2 ≤ p/2, the correctness is guaran-
teed if
‖f‖1 · 2d(ρ+λ) ≤ 2η−2,
equally,
d ≤ η − 2− lg ‖f‖1
ρ+ λ
.
If ‖f‖1 ≤ 2d, we have
d ≤ η − 2
ρ+ λ+ 1
.
Let d¯ =
⌊
η−2
ρ+λ+1
⌋
. Then an admissible function in our scheme is an arithmetic circuit f such
that deg f ≤ d¯ and ‖f‖1 ≤ 2d¯ as a polynomial over ZQ.
Parameter selection.
In the scheme, the parameters ρ, η, γ are given as follows.
• ρ = ω(lg λ) to resist the brute force attack on the EF-AGCD problem.
• η ≥ d¯(ρ + λ + 1) + 2 for the upper bound d¯ on degrees of admissible functions. This
is a consequence of discussions about correctness property. If we choose d¯ = O(λ) and
ρ = O(λ), then η = O(λ2).
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• γ = η2ω(lg λ) to resist known attacks on the EF-AGCD problem as explained in [25, 9] .
If we choose η = O(λ2), then γ = O(λ5)
Theorem 16. The scheme Π satisfies CCT.
Proof. Let ek be an evaluation key generated by Gen(1λ, Q) for some λ ∈ Z+ and a modulus Q,
f any admissible arity-l arithmetic circuit for some l ∈ Z+ and (ci)i∈I any element in Z| I |y0 for
some subset I of the index set {1, · · · , l}. We construct an algorithm ALG-CCT that determines
if c˜ = Eval(ek , f, (ci)i∈I) is constant or not with overwhelming probability, as follows.
procedure ALG-CCT(ek , f , (ci)i∈I):
if I = {1, · · · , l} then
return 1
else
(c0j )j /∈I , (c
1
j )j /∈I
$← (Zy0)l−| I |
if c˜(c0j )j /∈I ≡ c˜(c1j )j /∈I mod y0 then
return 1
else
return 0
The algorithm ALG-CCT is essentially the usual probabilistic polynomial identity testing.
In the scheme Π, c˜ can be considered as an (l − | I |)-variate polynomial over Zy0 of degree not
greater than deg f . We have
c˜ = f(ci)i∈I mod y0 : Zl−|I|y0 → Zy0
In case I = {1, · · · , l}, c˜ is clearly constant and the algorithm outputs 1 correctly. In case
I ( {1, · · · , l}, consider the function c˜′ := c˜ − c˜(c0j )j /∈I mod y0 for any (c0j )j /∈I ∈ (Zy0)l−| I |. If
c˜ is constant, then c˜′ is constantly zero and c˜′(c1j )j /∈I = c˜(c
1
j )j /∈I − c˜(c0j )j /∈I ≡ 0 mod y0 for any
(c1j )j /∈I ∈ (Zy0)l−| I |. So, c˜(c0j )j /∈I ≡ c˜(c1j )j /∈I mod y0 and the algorithm outputs 1 correctly. If c˜
is not constant, then c˜′ is not constantly zero and the algorithm outputs the incorrect answer 1
when c˜(c0j )j /∈I ≡ c˜(c1j )j /∈I mod y0, that is, c˜′(c1j )j /∈I ≡ 0 mod y0. This is the only case that the
algorithm outputs an incorrect answer. So the error probability of the algorithm is
Pr
[
c˜′(c1j )j /∈I ≡ 0 mod y0 | (c1j )j /∈I $← (Zy0)l−| I |
]
,
when c˜′ is not constantly zero.
To find an upper bound on the error probability of the algorithm using Schwartz-Zippel
lemma, we need the following fact. A 2λ-rough random integer y0 is square-free with over-
whelming probability and there exists some prime factor p′ of y0 such that c˜′ mod p′ is not
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constantly zero and p′ ≥ 2λ. From these, we have
Pr
[
c˜′(c1j )j /∈I ≡ 0 mod y0 | (c1j )j /∈I $← (Zy0)l−| I |
]
≤ Pr
[
c˜′(c1j )j /∈I ≡ 0 mod p′ | (c1j )j /∈I $← (Zy0)l−| I |
]
= Pr
[
c˜′(c1j )j /∈I ≡ 0 mod p′ | (c1j )j /∈I $← (Zp′)l−| I |
]
≤ deg f
p′
≤ d¯
2λ
= negl(λ)
where d¯ is the upper bound on degrees of the admissible functions in our scheme, which is
polynomially bounded. Therefore, the error probability of the algorithm is negligible and we
can efficiently determine if c˜ is constant or not with overwhelming probability.
5.6 Security Proof
In this section, we prove our HAE scheme satisfies both IND-CPA and SUF-CPA. From this,
we conclude that Π is actually IND-CCA and SUF-CCA by Theorem 11 and Theorem 12. For
simplicity, we consider the scheme Π as an ideal scheme which is obtained by replacing the
pseudorandom function F in our scheme with a random function from {0, 1}λ into Zq0 . If F is
pseudorandom, then the security of this ideal scheme Π implies that of the real scheme.
Privacy
The privacy of the scheme Π is stated in the following theorem.
As we mentioned in Sec. 3.2, Coron et al. proved the equivalence of the EF-AGCD assump-
tion and the decisional EF-AGCD assumption in [10]. So, this theorem actually shows that Π
is IND-CPA under the computational (ρ, η, γ)-EF-AGCD assumption.
Theorem 17. The scheme Π is IND-CPA under the decisional (ρ, η, γ)-EF-AGCD assumption.
Proof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A for the IND-CPA security game of the scheme
Π such that
Pr
[
IND-CPAΠ,A(1
λ, Q) = 1
]
≥ 1/2 + (λ)
for some modulus Q ∈ [2, 2λ] and some non-negligible function . Then, we can construct a
PPT distinguisher D for the decisional (ρ, η, γ)-EF-AGCD problem, by simulating the game
IND-CPAΠ,A as follows.
Distinguisher D(ρ, η, γ, y0,D(p, q0, ρ), z):
Initialization. Initialize a set S ← ∅. Give ek = (Q, y0) to A.
Queries. For each encryption query (τ,m) ∈ {0, 1}λ × ZQ of A, if (τ, ·, ·) 6∈ S, then
sample x ← D(p, q0, ρ), compute c := (xQ + m) mod y0, return c to A, and
update S by S ← S ∪ {(τ,m, c)}. Otherwise, reject the query.
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Challenge. For the challenge (τ∗,m∗0,m∗1) of A, if (τ∗, ·, ·) 6∈ S, then flip a coin
b
$← {0, 1}, compute the challenge ciphertext c∗ := (zQ+m∗b) mod y0, return c∗
to A, and update S by S ← S ∪ {(τ∗,m∗b , c∗)}. Otherwise, reject the challenge.
Queries. Again A may make encryption queries adaptively, and such a query is
answered exactly as before.
Finalization. For the output b′ of A, return 1 if b = b′. Otherwise, return 0.
Note that gcd(y0, Q) = 1 since y0 has no prime factors less than 2
λ and Q is not greater
than 2λ. Let us consider the distribution of c produced by D in the Queries phase. Since
c = xQ+m mod y0 for x← D(p, q0, ρ), we have c = pqQ+ rQ+m mod y0 for some q $← [0, q0)
and r
$← (−2ρ, 2ρ). Therefore, c ≡ rQ+m (mod p). Also, since q is uniform random on [0, q0),
c mod q0 is also uniform random on Zq0 .
So, the distribution of c is identical to that of a real ciphertext and the encryption oracle
can be simulated using D(p, q0, ρ).
Now, consider the distribution of c∗ in the Challenge phase. If z ← D(p, q0, ρ), then the
distribution of c∗ is identical to that of original security game by the same reason as above. But
if z
$← Zy0 , then c∗ is also uniformly distributed over Zy0 regardless of a random bit b. Thus, c∗
does not contain any information on the challenge plaintext mb. So
Pr [D(ρ, η, γ, y0,D(p, q0, ρ), z) = 1 | z ← D(p, q0, ρ)] = Pr
[
IND-CPAΠ,A(1
λ, Q) = 1
]
≥ 1
2
+ (λ)
and
Pr
[
D(ρ, η, γ, y0,D(p, q0, ρ), z) = 1 | z $← Zy0
]
=
1
2
Therefore, the advantage of D is at least non-negligible , and this completes the proof.
Authenticity
The authenticity of the scheme Π is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 18. If the (ρ, η, γ)-EF-AGCD assumption holds, then the scheme Π is SUF-CPA.
Proof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A for the game SUF-CPA such that
Pr
[
SUF-CPAΠ,A(1
λ, Q) = 1
]
≥ (λ)
for some modulus Q ∈ [2, 2λ] and some non-negligible function . Then, we can construct a
PPT algorithm B for the (ρ, η, γ)-EF-AGCD problem, by simulating the game SUF-CPAΠ,A as
follows.
Algorithm B(ρ, η, γ, y0,D(p, q0, ρ)):
Initialization. Initialize S ← ∅. Give ek = (Q, y0) to A.
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Queries. For each encryption query (τ,m) ∈ {0, 1}λ × ZQ of A, if (τ, ·, ·) 6∈ S, then
sample x ← D(p, q0, ρ), compute c := (xQ + m) mod y0, return c to A, and
update S by S ← S ∪ {(τ,m, c)}. Otherwise, reject the query.
Finalization. Let ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ) be the forgery attempt output by A. For each
i ∈ {1, · · · , l}, set the value of ci as follows. Let ci = c if (τi,m, c) ∈ S for
some m ∈ M and c ∈ C. Otherwise, choose ci $← Zy0 . And then, compute
c˜ = f(c1, · · · , cl) mod y0. Output y0/ gcd(y0, c˜− cˆ).
For the same reason as in Theorem 17, the simulation of the encryption oracle by B is exact.
Consider the forgery attempt ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ) made by A in the Finalization phase. In case
((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ) is a strong forgery of type 1, c˜ = f(ci)i∈I is not constant, where I is the set of
indices i such that τi is not new with respect to S. So we can apply the probabilistic polynomial
identity test as in Theorem 16:
Pr
[
c˜(cj)j 6∈I ≡ cˆ mod y0 | (cj)j /∈I $← (Zy0)l−| I |
]
≤ d¯
2λ
where d¯ is an upper bound on degrees of admissible functions in our scheme and is polynomi-
ally bounded. This means that c˜(cj)j 6∈I 6= cˆ mod y0 with overwhelming probability. In case
((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ) is a strong forgery of type 2, c˜(cj)j 6∈I = c˜ 6= cˆ mod y0.
Hence in both cases, we have c˜ 6= cˆ mod y0, but also c˜ ≡ cˆ mod q0, since any strong forgery
is valid. Therefore, gcd(y0, cˆ − c˜) = q0 and the output of the algorithm A′ is exactly p with
overwhelming probability if the challenge made by A is a strong forgery. Since A makes a strong
forgery with non-negligible probability, A′ outputs the correct answer p with non-negligible
probability.
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Chapter 6
Generic Compositions of HAE
It is natural that we think about a general mothod to combine a homomorhpic secret-key en-
cryption (HSE) for privacy and a homomorphic message authentication (HMA) for authenticity
so that we get a homomorphic authenticated encryption (HAE) for both privacy and authentic-
ity. This topic can be said to be the generic composition of a HAE. For the generic composition
of a classical primitive of an authenticated encryption, there is the work [2] by Bellare and
Namprempre. The following table is a summary of their results.
Along the line of their research, the same method will be applied to the homomorphic version
of an authenticated encryption, in this chapter. For a given homomorphic secret-key encryption
scheme HSE = (Gen,Enc,Eval,Dec) and a given homomorphic message authentication scheme
HMA = (Gen,Auth,Eval,Verify), we consider three ways of the generic composition of an HAE;
Encrypt and Authenticate (E&A), Authenticate then Encrypt (AtE), Encrypt then Authenticate
(EtA). In E&A composition, the final ciphertext is the concatenation of the ciphertext made by
the encryption of HSE and the tag made by the authentication of HMA for a given plaintext.
In AtE composition, a tag is made by the authentication of HMA for a given plaintext, then
the final ciphertext is made by the encryption of HSE for the plaintext and the tag. In EtA
composition, a ciphertext is made by the encryption of HSE for a given plaintext, then the final
ciphertext is the concatenation of the ciphertext and a tag made by the authentication of HMA
for the ciphertext.
In this chapter, three ways of generic composion of a homomorhpic authenticated encryption
are described and analyzed on their security. We consider the cases that HSE is IND-CPA and
HMA is either UF-CMA or UF-CTA or SUF-CMA.
6.1 Encrypt and Authenticate (E&A)
The E&A composition of a homomorphic secret-key encryption scheme HSE = (Gen,Enc,Eval,Dec)
and a homomorphic message authentication scheme HMA = (Gen,Auth,Eval,Verify) is a ho-
momorphic authenticated encryption scheme HAE = (Gen,Enc,Eval,Dec), which is defined as
follows. For simplicity and compatibility, we assume that HSE.M = HMA.M, HSE.F = HMA.F .
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SCHEME. HAEE&A = (Gen,Enc,Eval,Dec)
• (ek , sk)← Gen(1λ): Given a security parameter λ, generate key pairs (HSE.ek ,HSE.sk)←
HSE.Gen(1λ) and (HMA.ek ,HMA.sk)← HMA.Gen(1λ). Return (ek , sk), where
ek := (HSE.ek ,HMA.ek) and sk := (HSE.sk ,HMA.sk).
• c← Enc(sk , τ,m): Given the secret key sk = (HSE.sk ,HMA.sk), a label τ ∈ L
and a plaintext m ∈ M, encrypt c′ ← HSE.Enc(HSE.sk ,m) and authenticate
σ ← HMA.Auth (HMA.sk , τ,m). Return c := (c′, σ).
• c ← Eval(ek , f, c1, · · · , cl): Given the evaluation key ek = (HSE.ek ,HMA.ek),
an arity-l admissible function f :Ml →M and l ciphertexts c1, · · · , cl, where
ci = (c
′
i, σi) for each i = 1, · · · , l, evaluate c′ ← HSE.Eval(HSE.ek , f, c′1, · · · , c′l)
and σ ← HMA.Eval(HMA.ek , f, σ1, · · · , σl). Return c := (c′, σ).
• m or⊥ ← Dec(sk , (f, τ1, · · · , τl), c): Given the secret key sk = (HSE.sk ,HMA.sk),
a labeled program (f, τ1, · · · , τl), a ciphertext c = (c′, σ), decryptm← HSE.Dec(HSE.sk , c′)
and then verify b ← HMA.Verify(HMA.sk , (f, τ1, · · · , τl),m, σ). If b = 1, then
return m. Otherwise, return ⊥.
Note that M := HSE.M = HMA.M, F := HSE.F = HMA.F , L := HMA.L and C :=
HSE.C × HMA.T . The correctness and the compactness of the scheme are straightforward.
Security Analysis
Now, let us consider the security of the E&A composition HAEE&A.
Theorem 19. The E&A composition does not preserve IND-CPA of HSE.
Proof. Let a homomorphic message authentication scheme HMA = (Gen,Auth,Eval,Verify) be
given. Then we can construct the following trivial scheme HMA′ = (Gen′,Auth′,Eval′,Verify′),
which transparently reveals a message.
SCHEME. HMA′ = (Gen′,Auth′,Eval′,Verify′)
• (ek , sk)← Gen′(1λ): Given a security parameter λ, return (ek , sk)← Gen(1λ).
• σ′ ← Auth′(sk , τ,m): Given the secret key sk , a label τ ∈ L and a message
m ∈M, return σ′ := (m,σ), where σ ← Auth(sk , τ,m).
• σ′ ← Eval′(ek , f, σ′1, · · · , σ′l): Given the evaluation key ek , an arity-l admissible
function f : Ml → M and l tags σ′1, · · · , σ′l, where σ′i = (mi, σi) for each
i = 1, · · · , l, return σ′ := (f(m1, · · · ,ml),Eval(ek , f, σ1, · · · , σl)).
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• b ← Verify(sk , (f, τ1, · · · , τl),m′, σ′): Given the secret key sk , a labeled pro-
gram (f, τ1, · · · , τl), a message m′ ∈ M and a tag σ′ = (m,σ), return b ←
Verify(sk , (f, τ1, · · · , τl),m, σ) if m = m′. Otherwise, return 0.
Clearly, HMA′ is as secure as HMA. And an HAE scheme constructed by E&A composition
of HSE and HMA′ produces a ciphertext which transparently contains a plaintext. Thus, it can
not satisfy IND-CPA even though HSE is IND-CPA.
The following theorem shows that the E&A composition preserves the unforgeability of HMA.
Theorem 20. If HMA is UF-CMA or UF-CTA, then HAEE&A is UF-CPA or UF-CCA, re-
spectively.
Proof. Let A be a PPT adversary for the game UF-CPAHAE with non-negligible advantage.
We construct an adversary A′ for the game UF-CMAHMA with non-negligible advantage, which
simulates the game UF-CPAHAE,A as follows.
A′(1λ):
Initialization. For a given key HMA.ek , generate a pair of keys (HSE.ek ,HSE.sk)←
HSE.Gen(1λ). Then ek := (HSE.ek ,HMA.ek) is given to A.
Queries. For each encryption query (τ,m) of A, encrypt c′ ← HSE.Enc(HSE.sk ,m)
and get an answer σ for the query (τ,m) from the authentication oracle HMA.Auth.
Return c := (c′, σ) to A as an answer for the query.
Finalization. For the forgery attempt ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), (cˆ′, σˆ)) ofA, output ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), mˆ, σˆ),
where mˆ← HSE.Dec(HSE.sk , cˆ′).
Clearly, A′ exactly simulates the game UF-CPAHAE,A. Let tHAE := ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), (cˆ′, σˆ)) and
tHMA := ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), mˆ, σˆ) where mˆ ← HSE.Dec(HSE.sk , cˆ′). Suppose that tHAE is a forgery
in HAE. Then tHMA is valid, that is, 1← HMA.Verify(HMA.sk , tHMA) since ⊥ 6= Dec(sk , tHAE). If
tHAE is a forgery of type 1, then tHMA is also a forgery of type 1 since both schemes HAE and HMA
use the same admissible function f . And if tHAE is a forgery of type 2, then tHMA is also a forgery
of type 2 since m˜ 6= mˆ = Dec(sk , tHAE). Therefore, we can conclude that a forgery attempt
((f, τ1, · · · , τl), mˆ, σˆ) of A′ is a forgery in HMA, if a forgery attempt ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), (cˆ′, σˆ)) of A
is a forgery in HAE. So,
AdvUF-CMAHMA,A′ (λ) ≥ AdvUF-CPAHAE,A (λ)
Therefore, AdvUF-CMAHMA,A′ (λ) is non-negligible if Adv
UF-CPA
HAE,A (λ) is non-negligible.
Now, we consider the case that A is an PPT adversary for the game UF-CCAHAE with
non-negligible advantage. We construct an adversary A′ for the game UF-CTAHMA with non-
negligible advantage, which simulates the game UF-CCAHAE,A as follows. We only describe the
query phase, since the other phases are equal to the above.
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A′(1λ):
Queries. For each encryption query (τ,m) of A, encrypt c′ ← HSE.Enc(HSE.sk ,m)
and get an answer σ for the query (τ,m) from the authentication oracle HMA.Auth.
Return c := (c′, σ) to A as an answer for the query. For each decryption
query ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), (c′, σ)) of A, decrypt m ← HSE.Dec(HSE.sk , c′) and get
an answer b for the query ((f, τ1, · · · , τl),m, σ) from the verification oracle
HMA.Verify. If b = 1, return m. Otherwise, return ⊥.
Clearly, A′ exactly simulates the game UF-CCAHAE,A. In the same reason as the above, a
forgery attempt ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), mˆ, σˆ) ofA′ is a forgery in HMA, if a forgery attempt ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), (cˆ′, σˆ))
of A is a forgery in HAE. So,
AdvUF-CTAHMA,A′ (λ) ≥ AdvUF-CCAHAE,A (λ)
Therefore, AdvUF-CTAHMA,A′ (λ) is non-negligible if Adv
UF-CCA
HAE,A (λ) is non-negligible.
Theorem 21. The E&A composition does not preserve the strong unforgeability of an HMA.
Proof. In general, HSE has the following property due to its homomorphic property.
For a given ciphertext c′ in a scheme HSE, we can easily produce another cipertext
c′′ such that HSE.Dec(HSE.sk , c′) = HSE.Dec(HSE.sk , c′′).
This means a strong forgery (c′′, σ) in HAEE&A can be easily made, for a given normal ciphertext
(c′, σ).
From the above thoerems, we can conclude that this parallel application of HSE and HMA
fails to combine the privacy of HSE and the authenticity of HMA. This means that the E&A
composition is useless to construct a HAE scheme, at least in generic ways.
6.2 Authenticate then Encrypt (AtE)
The AtE composition of a homomorphic secret-key encryption scheme HSE = (Gen,Enc,Eval,Dec)
and a homomorphic message authentication scheme HMA = (Gen,Auth,Eval,Verify) is a homo-
morphic authenticated encryption scheme scheme HAEAtE = (Gen,Enc,Eval,Dec), which is de-
fined as follows. For simplicity and compatibility, we assume that HSE.M = HMA.M×HMA.T .
SCHEME. HAEAtE = (Gen,Enc,Eval,Dec)
• (ek , sk)← Gen(1λ): Given a security parameter λ, generate key pairs (HSE.ek ,HSE.sk)←
HSE.Gen(1λ) and (HMA.ek ,HMA.sk)← HMA.Gen(1λ). Return (ek , sk), where
ek := (HSE.ek ,HMA.ek) and sk := (HSE.sk ,HMA.sk).
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• c← Enc(sk , τ,m): Given the secret key sk = (HSE.sk ,HMA.sk), a label τ ∈ L
and a plaintext m ∈ M, authenticate σ ← HMA.Auth(HMA.sk , τ,m) then
encrypt c← HSE.Enc(HSE.sk , (m,σ)). Return c.
• c ← Eval(ek , f, c1, · · · , cl): Given the evaluation key ek = (HSE.ek ,HMA.ek),
an arity-l admissible function f :Ml →M and l ciphertexts c1, · · · , cl, evaluate
c← HSE.Eval(HSE.ek , f¯ , c1, · · · , cl) where f¯ : HSE.Ml → HSE.M is defined as
below.
f¯((m1, σ1), · · · , (ml, σl)) = (f(m1, · · · ,ml),HMA.Eval(HMA.ek , f, σ1, · · · , σl))
Return c.
• m or⊥ ← Dec(sk , (f, τ1, · · · , τl), c): Given the secret key sk = (HSE.sk ,HMA.sk),
a labeled program (f, τ1, · · · , τl), a ciphertext c ∈ C, decrypt (m,σ)← HSE.Dec(HSE.sk , c),
then verify b← HMA.Verify(HMA.sk , (f, τ1, · · · , τl),m, σ). If b = 1, then return
m. Otherwise, return ⊥.
Note that M := HMA.M, L := HMA.L and C := HSE.C. Importantly, a function f is
admissible in the scheme HAEAtE if f is admissible in the HMA and f¯ is admissible in the HSE.
The correctness and the compactness of the scheme are straightforward.
Security Analysis
Now, let us consider the security of the AtE composition HAEAtE . The following theorem shows
that the AtE composition preserves privacy of HSE.
Theorem 22. If HSE is IND-CPA, then HAEAtE is IND-CPA.
Proof. Let A be a PPT adversary for the game IND-CPAHAE with non-negligible advantage.
We construct an adversary A′ for the game IND-CPAHSE with non-negligible advantage, which
simulates the game IND-CPAHAE,A as follows.
A′(1λ):
Initialization. For a given key HSE.ek , generate a pair of keys (HMA.ek ,HMA.sk)←
HMA.Gen(1λ). Then ek := (HSE.ek ,HMA.ek) is given to A.
Queries. For each encryption query (τ,m) ofA, authenticate σ ← HMA.Auth(HMA.sk , τ,m)
and get an answer c for the query (m,σ) from the encryption oracle HSE.Enc.
Return c to A as an answer for the query.
Challenge. For the challenge (τ∗,m∗0,m∗1) of A, σ∗b ← HMA.Auth(HMA.sk , τ∗,m∗b)
for each b ∈ {0, 1}. Get the challenge ciphertext c∗ for the challenge ((m∗0, σ∗0), (m∗1, σ∗1))
from the encryption oracle HSE.Enc. Return c∗ to A.
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Queries. For each encryption query (τ,m) of A, answer for the query precisely as
before.
Finalization. For the output bit b′ of A, return b′
Clearly, A′ exactly simulates the game IND-CPAΠ,A and
AdvIND-CPAHSE,A′ (λ) = Adv
IND-CPA
HAE,A (λ)
Therefore, AdvIND-CPAHSE,A′ (λ) is also non-negligible if Adv
IND-CPA
HAE,A (λ) is non-negligible.
The following theorem shows that the AtE composition preserves the unforgeability of HMA.
Theorem 23. If HMA is UF-CMA or UF-CTA, then HAEAtE is UF-CPA or UF-CCA, respec-
tively.
Proof. Let A be a PPT adversary for the game UF-CPAHAE with non-negligible advantage.
We construct an adversary A′ for the game UF-CMAHMA with non-negligible advantage, which
simulates the game UF-CPAHAE,A as follows.
A′(1λ):
Initialization. For a given key HMA.ek , generate a pair of keys (HSE.ek ,HSE.sk)←
HSE.Gen(1λ). Then ek := (HSE.ek ,HMA.ek) is given to A.
Queries. For each encryption query (τ,m) of A, get an answer σ for the query (τ,m)
from the authentication oracle HMA.Auth and encrypt c← HSE.Enc(HSE.sk , (m,σ)).
Return c to A as an answer for the query.
Finalization. For the forgery attempt ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ) ofA, output ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), mˆ, σˆ),
where (mˆ, σˆ)← HSE.Dec(HSE.sk , cˆ).
Clearly, A′ exactly simulates the game UF-CPAHSE,A. And a forgery attempt ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), mˆ, σˆ)
of A′ is a forgery in HMA, if a forgery attempt ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ) of A is a forgery in HAE. So,
AdvUF-CMAHMA,A′ (λ) ≥ AdvUF-CPAHAE,A (λ)
Therefore, AdvUF-CMAHMA,A′ (λ) is also non-negligible if is non-negligible.
In case that A is an PPT adversary for the game UF-CCAHAE with non-negligible advantage.
We construct an adversary A′ for the game UF-CTAHMA with non-negligible advantage, which
simulates the game UF-CCAHAE,A as follows. We only describe the query phase, since the other
phases are equal to the above.
A′(1λ):
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Queries. For each encryption query (τ,m) of A, get an answer σ for the query (τ,m)
from the authentication oracle HMA.Auth and encrypt c← HSE.Enc(HSE.sk , (m,σ)).
Return c toA as an answer for the query. For each decryption query ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), c)
of A, decrypt (m,σ) ← HSE.Dec(HSE.sk , c) and get an answer b for the query
((f, τ1, · · · , τl),m, σ) from the verification oracle HMA.Verify. If b = 1, return
m. Otherwise, return ⊥.
Clearly, A′ exactly simulates the game UF-CCAHAE,A. And a forgery attempt ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), mˆ, σˆ)
of A′ is a forgery in HMA, if a forgery attempt ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ) of A is a forgery in HAE. So,
AdvUF-CTAHMA,A′ (λ) ≥ AdvUF-CCAHAE,A (λ)
Therefore, AdvUF-CTAHMA,A′ (λ) is also non-negligible.
Theorem 24. The AtE composition does not preserve the strong unforgeability of an HMA.
Proof. In general, HSE has the following property due to its homomorphic property.
For a given ciphertext c in a scheme HSE, we can easily produce another ciphertext
c′ such that HSE.Dec(HSE.sk , c) = HSE.Dec(HSE.sk , c′).
This means a strong forgery c′ in HAEE&A can be easily made, for a given normal ciphertext
c.
6.3 Encrypt then Authenticate (EtA)
The EtA composition of a homomorphic secret-key encryption scheme HSE = (Gen,Enc,Eval,Dec)
and a homomorphic message authentication scheme HMA = (Gen,Auth,Eval,Verify) is a ho-
momorphic authenticated encryption scheme scheme HAEEtA = (Gen,Enc,Eval,Dec), which is
defined as follows. For simplicity and compatibility, we assume that HMA.M = HSE.C.
SCHEME. HAEEtA = (Gen,Enc,Eval,Dec)
• (ek , sk)← Gen(1λ): Given a security parameter λ, generate key pairs (HSE.ek ,HSE.sk)←
HSE.Gen(1λ) and (HMA.ek ,HMA.sk)← HMA.Gen(1λ). Return (ek , sk), where
ek := (HSE.ek ,HMA.ek) and sk := (HSE.sk ,HMA.sk).
• c ← Enc(sk , τ,m): Given the secret key sk = (HSE.sk ,HMA.sk), a label τ ∈
HMA.L and a plaintext m ∈ HSE.M, encrypt c′ ← HSE.Enc(HSE.sk ,m) then
authenticate σ ← HMA.Auth(HMA.sk , τ, c′). Return c := (c′, σ).
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• c˜ ← Eval(ek , f, c1, · · · , cl): Given the evaluation key ek = (HSE.ek ,HMA.ek),
an arity-l admissible function f : (HSE.M)l → HSE.M and l ciphertexts
c1, · · · , cl, where ci = (c′i, σi) for each i = 1, · · · , l, evaluate c˜′ ← HSE.Eval(HSE.ek , f, c′1, · · · , c′l)
and σ˜ ← HMA.Eval(HMA.ek , f¯ , σ1, · · · , σl), where f¯ : (HMA.M)l → HMA.M
is defined as below.
f¯(c1, · · · , cl) := HSE.Eval(HSE.ek , f, c1, · · · , cl)
. Return c˜ = (c˜′, σ˜)
• m or⊥ ← Dec(sk , (f, τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ): Given the secret key sk = (HSE.sk ,HMA.sk),
a labeled program (f, τ1, · · · , τl), a ciphertext cˆ = (cˆ′, σˆ), verify b← HMA.Verify(HMA.sk , (f¯ ,
τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ′, σˆ). If b = 1, then return m := HSE.Dec(HSE.sk , cˆ′). Otherwise,
return ⊥.
Note thatM := HSE.M, L := HMA.L and C := HSE.C×HMA.T . A function f is admissible
in the scheme HAEEtA if f is admissble in HSE and f¯ is admissible in the HMA. The correctness
and the compactness of the scheme are straightforward.
Security Analysis
Now, let us consider the security of the EtA composition HAEEtA. The following theorem shows
that the EtA composition preserves the privacy IND-CPA of HSE as AtE composition does.
Theorem 25. If HSE is IND-CPA, then HAEEtA is IND-CPA.
Proof. Let A be a PPT adversary for the game IND-CPAHAE with non-negligible advantage.
We construct an adversary A′ for the game IND-CPAHSE with non-negligible advantage, which
simulates the game IND-CPAHAE,A as follows.
A′(1λ):
Initialization. For a given key HSE.ek , generate a pair of keys (HMA.ek ,HMA.sk)←
HMA.Gen(1λ) and initialize a set S to be empty. Then ek := (HSE.ek ,HMA.ek)
is given to A.
Queries. For each encryption query (τ,m) of A, if (τ, ·, ·) ∈ S, then reject the query
of A. Otherwise, get an answer c′ for the query m from the encryption oracle
HSE.Enc and σ ← HMA.Auth(HMA.sk , τ, c′). Return c := (c′, σ) to A as an
answer for the query.
Challenge. For the challenge (τ∗,m∗0,m∗1) of A, if (τ∗, ·, ·) ∈ S, then reject the chal-
lenge of A. Otherwise, get the challenge ciphertext c′∗ for the challenge (m∗0,m∗1)
from the encryption oracle HSE.Enc and σ∗ ← HMA.Auth(HMA.sk , τ∗, c′∗). Re-
turn c∗ := (c′∗, σ∗) to A.
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Queries. For each encryption query (τ,m) of A, answer for the query precisely as
before.
Finalization. For the output bit b′ of A, return b′
Clearly, if c′∗ ← HSE.Enc(HSE.sk ,m∗b), then c∗ ← Enc(sk , τ∗,m∗b). So, A′ exactly simulates
the game IND-CPAHAE,A and
AdvIND-CPAHSE,A′ (λ) = Adv
IND-CPA
HAE,A (λ)
Therefore, AdvIND-CPAHSE,A′ (λ) is also non-negligible.
The following theorem shows that the EtA composition preserves the unforgeability of HMA.
Theorem 26. If HMA is UF-CMA or UF-CTA, then HAEEtA is UF-CPA or UF-CCA, respec-
tively.
Proof. Let A be a PPT adversary for the game UF-CPAHAE with non-negligible advantage.
We construct an adversary A′ for the game UF-CMAHMA with non-negligible advantage, which
simulates the game UF-CPAHAE,A as follows.
A′(1λ):
Initialization. For a given key HMA.ek , generate a pair of keys (HSE.ek ,HSE.sk)←
HSE.Gen(1λ) and initialize a set S to be empty. Then ek := (HSE.ek ,HMA.ek)
is given to A.
Queries. For each encryption query (τ,m) of A, if (τ, ·, ·) ∈ S, then reject the query
of A. Otherwise, encrypt c← HSE.Enc(HSE.sk ,m) and get an answer σ for the
query (τ, c) from the authentication oracle HMA.Auth. Return (c, σ) to A as
an answer for the query.
Finalization. For the forgery attempt ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), (cˆ, σˆ)) ofA, output ((f¯ , τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ, σˆ),
where f¯ : (HMA.M)l → HMA.M is defined as below.
f¯(c1, · · · , cl) := HSE.Eval(HSE.ek , f, c1, · · · , cl)
In case that A is an PPT adversary for the game UF-CCAHAE with non-negligible advantage,
we can also construct an adversary A′′ for the game UF-CTAHMA with non-negligible advantage,
which simulates the game UF-CCAHAE,A as follows. We only describe the query phase, since
the other phases are equal to the above.
A′′(1λ):
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Queries. For each encryption query (τ,m) of A, if (τ, ·, ·) ∈ S, then reject the query
of A. Otherwise, encrypt c← HSE.Enc(HSE.sk ,m) and get an answer σ for the
query (τ, c) from the authentication oracle HMA.Auth. Return (c, σ) to A as
an answer for the query. For each decryption query ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), (c, σ)) of A,
get an answer b for the query ((f¯ , τ1, · · · , τl), c, σ) from the verification oracle
HMA.Verify. If b = 1, return m← HSE.Dec(HSE.sk , c). Otherwise, return ⊥.
Clearly, A′ and A′′exactly simulates the game UF-CPAHAE,A and UF-CCAHAE,A, respectively.
Now we only need to show that if t := ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), (cˆ, σˆ)) is a forgery in HAE, then
t′ := ((f¯ , τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ, σˆ) is a forgery in HMA. If so,
AdvUF-CMAHMA,A′ (λ) ≥ AdvUF-CPAHAE,A (λ)
and
AdvUF-CTAHMA,A′′(λ) ≥ AdvUF-CCAHAE,A (λ).
Thus, we can conclude that AdvUF-CMAHMA,A′ (λ) and Adv
UF-CTA
HMA,A′′(λ) is non-negligible if Adv
UF-CPA
HAE,A (λ)
and AdvUF-CCAHAE,A (λ) is non-negligible, respectively.
Suppose that t is a forgery in the scheme HAE. Firstly, 1 ← HMA.Verify(HMA.sk , t′), that
is, t′ is valid in HMA since t is valid in HAE. In case that t is a forgery of type 1, f(mi)i∈I is
nonconstant and so f¯(ci)i∈I is also nonconstant. This means that t′ is a forgery of type 1 in HMA.
In case that t is a forgery of type 2, m˜ := f(mi)i∈I is constant and m˜ 6= HSE.Dec(HSE.sk , cˆ).
In this case, t′ is clearly a forgery of type 1 in HMA if f¯(ci)i∈I is nonconstant. If c˜ := f¯(ci)i∈I
is constant, then c˜ 6= cˆ since m˜ ← HSE.Dec(HSE.sk , c˜). This means that t′ is a forgery of type
2 in HMA. Therefore, if t is a forgery in HAE, then t′ is a forgery in HMA. This completes the
proof.
The following theorem shows that the EtA composition also preserves the strong unforge-
ability of HMA.
Theorem 27. If HMA is SUF-CMA or SUF-CTA, then HAEAtE is SUF-CPA or SUF-CCA,
respectively.
Proof. Let A be a PPT adversary for the game SUF-CPAHAE with non-negligible advantage.
We construct an adversary A′ for the game SUF-CMAHMA with non-negligible advantage, which
simulates the game SUF-CPAHAE,A in the same way as the game A
′ described in the proof of
the previous theorem. In case that A is an PPT adversary for the game SUF-CCAHAE with
non-negligible advantage, we can also construct an adversary A′′ for the game SUF-CTAHMA
with non-negligible advantage, which simulates the game SUF-CCAHAE,A in the same way as the
game A′′ described in the proof of the previous theorem. Clearly, A′ and A′′exactly simulates
the game SUF-CPAHAE,A and SUF-CCAHAE,A, respectively.
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Now we only need to show that if t := ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), (cˆ, σˆ)) is a strong forgery in HAE, then
t′ := ((f¯ , τ1, · · · , τl), cˆ, σˆ) is a strong forgery in HMA. If so,
AdvSUF-CMAHMA,A′ (λ) ≥ AdvSUF-CPAHAE,A (λ)
and
AdvSUF-CTAHMA,A′′ (λ) ≥ AdvSUF-CCAHAE,A (λ).
Thus, we can conclude that AdvSUF-CMAHMA,A′ (λ) and Adv
SUF-CTA
HMA,A′′ (λ) is non-negligible if Adv
SUF-CPA
HAE,A (λ)
and AdvSUF-CCAHAE,A (λ) is non-negligible, respectively.
Suppose that t is a strong forgery in the scheme HAE. Firstly, 1← HMA.Verify(HMA.sk , t′),
that is, t′ is valid in HMA since t is valid in HAE. In case that t is a strong forgery of type 1,
either f(mi)i∈I or Eval(ek , f, (ci, σi)i∈I) is nonconstant. If f(mi)i∈I is nonconstant, then f¯(ci)i∈I
is also nonconstant and so t′ is a strong forgery of type 1 in HMA. If Eval(ek , f, (ci, σi)i∈I) is
nonconstant, then either f¯(ci)i∈I or HMA.Eval(HMA.ek , f¯ , (σi)i∈I is nonconstant since
Eval(ek , f, (ci, σi)i∈I) = (f¯(ci)i∈I ,HMA.Eval(HMA.ek , f¯ , (σi)i∈I)).
This means that t′ is a strong forgery of type 1 in HMA. In case that t is a forgery of type 2,
(c˜, σ˜) := Eval(ek , f, (ci, σi)i∈I) is constant and (c˜, σ˜) 6= (cˆ, σˆ). In this case, t′ is clearly a forgery
of type 2 in HMA. Therefore, if t is a strong forgery in HAE, then t′ is a strong forgery in HMA.
This completes the proof.
Theorem 28. If HSE is IND-CPA and HMA is UF-CTA, then HAEEtA is IND-CCA .
Proof. Let A be a PPT adversary for the game IND-CCAHAE with non-negligible advantage.
We construct an adversary A′ for the game IND-CPAHSE with non-negligible advantage, which
simulates the game IND-CCAHAE,A as follows.
A′(1λ):
Initialization. Let ek := (HSE.ek ,HMA.ek) and then ek is given to A.
Queries. For each encryption query (τ,m) of A, if (τ, ·, ·) ∈ S, then reject the query
of A. Otherwise, get an answer c for the query m from the encryption oracle
HSE.Enc and then get an answer σ for the query (τ, c) from the authentication
oracle HMA.Auth. Return (c, σ) to A as an answer for the query. For each
decryption query ((f, τ1, · · · , τl), (c, σ)) of A, get an answer b for the query
((f¯ , τ1, · · · , τl), c, σ) from the verification oracle HMA.Verify. If b = 1, return
m = f(m1, · · · ,ml) as an answer for the query, where mi $←M for each i with
(τi, ·, ·) /∈ S. Otherwise, return ⊥.
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Challenge. For the challenge (τ∗,m∗0,m∗1) of A, if (τ∗, ·, ·) ∈ S, then reject the chal-
lenge of A. Otherwise, get the challenge ciphertext c∗ for challenge (m∗0,m∗1)
from HSE.Enc. Then, get an answer σ∗ for the query (τ∗, c∗) from the authen-
tication oracle HMA.Auth. Then return (c∗, t∗) to A.
Queries. For each encryption or decryption query of A, answer for the query pre-
cisely as before.
Finalization. For the output bit b′ of A, return b′
This game simulates the original security game IND-CCAHAE,A except that the decryption
query (f, τ1, · · · , τl, (c, σ)) of A is a forgery in HAE, that is,
1← HMA.Verify(HMA.sk , (f¯ , τ1, · · · , τl), c, σ)
f(m1, · · · ,ml) 6= HSE.Dec(HSE.sk , c).
As we have shown before, it means that ((f¯ , τ1, · · · , τl), c, t) is a forgery in HMA. Thus
AdvIND-CCAHAE (λ) ≤ AdvIND-CPAHSE (λ) + q ·AdvUF-CTAHMA (λ)
where q ≤ poly(λ) is the number of the decryption queries of A. This proves that AdvIND-CPAHSE (λ)
and AdvUF-CTAHMA (λ) are negligible, then Adv
IND-CCA
HAE (λ) is also negligible.
Corollary 1. If HSE is IND-CPA and HMA is SUF-CMA, then HAEEtA is IND-CCA and
SUF-CCA .
Corollary 2. If HSE is IND-CPA and HMA is UF-CTA, then HAEEtA is IND-CCA and
UF-CCA .
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